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Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the
Staged Arrest
Bennett L. Gershman*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 1, 1973, in the Criminal Court of the City of
New York, Kings County, Stephen Vitale was arraigned on a
charge of armed robbery. According to the complaining wit-
ness, Morton Hirsch, Vitale placed a pistol against Hirsch's
head, threatened him, and robbed him of over $8,000. The sup-
porting affidavit of Police Officer Brian Cosgrove stated that as
Vitale was fleeing from the robbery scene, Cosgove arrested
him and seized a pistol from him.'
On the surface, this proceeding appeared no different from
thousands of similar proceedings taking place daily in criminal
courts throughout the country. In fact, Vitale, Hirsch, and Cos-
grove were undercover agents; New York's Special Anti-Cor-
ruption Prosecutor had authorized their activities 2 as part of a
program to detect corruption in the criminal justice system. 3
False court documents, false statements made to judges, and
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Professor Judith S. Koffier for her critical suggestions. This
Article is dedicated to Dean Robert B. Fleming.
1. People v. Vitale, No. K340266 (Crim. Ct. of New York City, Kings
County, N.Y. Nov. 1, 1973).
2. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343,344-45,362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514-15 (1974),
affd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
3. Pursuant to an executive order of the Governor of New York State, a
special prosecutor was appointed to investigate corruption in the New York
City criminal justice system. N.Y. ADm. CODE tit. 9, §§ 1.55-1.59 (1972). This
action was prompted, in part, by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, popularly known
as the "Knapp Commission," which recommended the appointment of a special
and independent prosecuting attorney who would not be subject to the inher-
ent limitations on local prosecutors, including dependence on the police in or-
der to prosecute effectively. CoMnssION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF
POLICE CoRRuw roN AND THE Crry's ANn-ConxuPTIoN PROCEDURES, THE KNAPP
COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 13-16 (1972) (hereinafter cited as
KNAPP REPORT).
The author of this Article served from 1973-1976 as a Special Assistant At-
torney General in the office of the Special Prosecutor of the State of New York.
In that capacity, he investigated and prosecuted numerous corruption cases.
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false testimony given to a grand jury provided the staged arrest
with "legitimacy."4 As a result of this investigation, undercover
agents obtained evidence implicating three judges and two de-
fense attorneys in a corrupt scheme to affect legal proceedings
in the Vitale case.5
The efforts to prosecute these allegedly corrupt officials re-
sulted in swift and resounding judicial condemnation of the
state's undercover procedure. In Rao v. Nadjari,6 a federal
court labeled the prosecutor's conduct "foul, illegal and outra-
geous." 7 Echoing this shock, a state appellate court in Nigrone
v. Murtagh8 declared that "[s]uch a perversion of the criminal
justice system by an overzealous prosecutor is illegal, outra-
geous and intolerable and we condemn it."9 The latter court
quoted the celebrated dissent of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead
v. United States:10
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to
the citizen .... Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that
the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against this
One of the principal issues that he litigated for that office was the propriety of
the staged arrest technique, the subject of this Article.
There has been a dramatic increase from 1970 to 1978 in the prosecution
and conviction of federal and state public officials for crimes involving corrupt
activities. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS OF CORRUPT PUn-
uc OFFicIALs 1970-1978 (1979). There does not appear to be any separate statis-
tical study on corruption in the court system. There is no reason to expect,
however, that corruption in the court system is any less pervasive than corrup-
tion in other branches of government. The author's experience as a prosecutor
reinforces this belief.
For literature on the subject of corruption, see Judicial Discipline and Ten-
ure: Hearings on S. 295, S. 522, & S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); KNAPP REPORT, supra, at
15, 187; J. BoRKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1980); R. CONDON, OPERATIONAL GUIDE
To WHTE-CoLLAR CRIME ENFORCEMENT, MANAGING INvESTIGATION INTO PunLjc
CORRUPTION (1977); R. LYMAN, W. FLETCHER & J. GARDNER, PREVENTION, DETEC-
TION AND CORRECTION OF CORRUPTION (1977); G. NAFrALIS, WHrrE COLLAR
CRIMEs (1980).
4. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1974).
5. See Brief for Respondent at 7, 13, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330
N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
6. No. 75 Civ. 2376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1975).
7. Id. See Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1975).
8. 46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), aftd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45,
369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
9. 46 A.D.2d at 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
10. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.11
In contrast to the above condemnation, the courts tradition-
ally have condoned the use of undercover techniques against
private citizens when they involved both deception and partici-
pation in serious offenses, such as narcotics offenses, because
these techniques are practically indispensable to crime detec-
tion.1 2 Such crimes are usually conducted covertly. There are
no "victims" to complain to law enforcement officials, and there
is little tangible evidence of past unlawful activity. In the nar-
cotics area, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only
practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings
and a limited participation in their unlawful present
practices. 1 3
Not surprisingly, therefore, the experienced law enforce-
ment officials who directed the Vitale case concluded that it
was permissible to expose corruption in the well-insulated and
procedurally complex system of justice by penetrating that sys-
tem with a contrived case involving an undercover agent posing
as a defendant.14 They believed that a realistic and effective in-
vestigation was possible only if they fabricated a criminal case
and shepherded it through the various stages in the justice sys-
tem. With the sham arrest as bait, and with the investigators'
careful monitoring of the case, an act of corruption could be
detected.
In part II this Article discusses the relatively spare and un-
settled case law relating to the staged arrest, reflected prima-
rily in United States v. Archer15 and Nigrone v. Murtagh.'6 Part
11. 46 A.D.2d at 348, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
12. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495-96 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
13. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. One may argue that there is a
similar need for undercover techniques in investigations of judicial corruption.
See notes 297-99 infra and accompanying text.
14. Brief for Respondent at 6, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d
45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
15. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
16. 46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), a 'd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 34,
369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). Aside from these two cases, there has been virtually no
critical commentary or scholarly analysis of this investigative procedure, its re-
lation to the doctrine of entrapment, or its illumination of the need for greater
judicial control over investigative methods that the courts find offensive and
unfair. The absence of significant legal analysis in this area is surprising, for
while such an undercover operation admittedly is imaginative, innovative, and
controversial, its use parallels other investigative techniques that recently have
proven effective and successful in discovering corruption at other levels of gov-
ernment. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982);
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I of this Article examines the defense of entrapment, one of
the most confusing and controversial legal doctrines, and its
application to the staged arrest. Because the staged arrest in-
eluctably raises questions of offensive government conduct that
neither constitutes unlawful entrapment nor invades any in-
dependent rights of citizens, part IV considers the analysis of
courts that have invoked the due process clause to limit gov-
ernment investigations. In view of the failure of these courts to
provide any meaningful due process standards to control police
undercover practices, part V sets out objective criteria helpful
in evaluating the due process implications of undercover proce-
dures in general, and the staged arrest in particular. Finally,
part VI proposes, as a safeguard against government abuse of
power, a procedure similar to the warrant procedure for ob-
taining judicial authorization to conduct certain types of under-
cover investigations, in this instance a "staged arrest warrant."
II. THE STAGED ARREST: CASE LAW
When a federal prosecutor and a state prosecutor em-
ployed the simulated arrest during two unrelated government
investigations into the criminal justice system in New York
City, both investigations resulted in criminal prosecutions. In
United States v. Archer, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the convictions of three defendants-a prose-
cutor, a defense attorney, and a bail bond agent-for violations
of the Federal "Travel Act"' 7 on the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to show that the defendants used federal inter-
state facilities to commit the offenses of bribery and conspir-
acy.' 8 Thereafter, a state grand jury indicted the same
defendants for violations of state bribery and conspiracy laws.19
Their convictions were affirmed on appeal over claims that the
text accompanying notes 248-56 infra. Hence, legal analysis directed at the
staged arrest would be extremely valuable in assessing the lawfulness of other
types of creative and controversial law enforcement operations.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). The so-called 'Travel Act," entitled "Interstate
and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises," in
substance prohibits the use of any facility in interstate or foreign commerce to
commit or promote "unlawful activity," defined to include offenses involving
gambling, avoidance of liquor taxation, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, brib-
ery, or arson.
18. 486 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. Klein v. Murtagh, 44 A.D.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622, affid, 34 N.Y.2d 988,
318 N.E.2d 606, 360 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974) (court refused to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds of double jeopardy).
[Vol. 66:567
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use of the staged arrest technique barred prosecution.20
In the aftermath of United States v. Archer-perhaps upon
a suggestion contained in that opinion2 l-a New York State
prosecutor used the same investigative procedure to infiltrate
the justice system. As a result, three defendants-a judge and
two lawyers-were indicted for perjury. In Nigrone v. Murtagh,
an appellate court scathingly condemned the use of the staged
arrest.22 A majority, however, found that the perjury was in-
dependent of the misconduct and denied the motions to dis-
miss the indictments.2 3
A. UNITED STATES V. ARCHER
The staged arrest was conceived in February, 1972, as part
of an intensive combined federal and local investigation into
corruption within the New York criminal justice system.24 Fed-
eral prosecutors had reportedly received "abundant informa-
tion about the widespread fixing of cases in the Queen's
County District Attorney's office" 25 and believed that it was es-
sential to arrange undercover penetration of corrupt
activities.26
According to the scheme,27 a federal narcotics agent named
Sante Bario assumed the name of Salvatore Barone and posed
as a resident alien and member of the Las Vegas underworld.
Arrested and charged with the illegal possession of two hand-
guns, 28 Bario met a bail bond agent named Wasserberger, who,
in turn, introduced Bario to a Queens attorney named Klein.29
20. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979), affd, 49 N.Y.2d
978, 406 N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
21. 468 F.2d at 672 n.1 ("A special prosecutor has since been named by the
Governor of New York to investigate precisely the kind of corruption in offices
of New York City district attorneys at which the federal prosecutor's activities
here were aimed.").
22. 46 A.D.2d 343, 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516-17 (1974), aj-d, 36 N.Y.2d 421,
330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
23. Id. at 348, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
24. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 672.
25. Id. at 683. (on petition for rehearing).
26. Id. at 672.
27. Id. at 672-74.
28. Provided with two loaded pistols, a fake Nevada driver's license, and a
false immigration card, Bario was arrested by a New York City police officer
assigned to the investigation. Id.
29. Wasserberger told Bario that he knew a Queens attorney named Frank
Klein, with "'big connections,"' who could "'do something"' for Bario. Was-
serberger said that it was unfortunate that the case was going before the grand
jury because " 'it could have been taken care of before the lower court'" and
that they should try to "'get the case kicked out before it went any further."'
Id. at 673.
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Wasserberger and Klein, together with the Queens assistant
district attorney Norman Archer,30 fabricated a story to justify
Bario's possession of the guns. 31 Klein told Bario that the price
for this fix was $15,000, which Bario paid in marked bills.32
After a dress rehearsal in Klein's office, Bario went before
the grand jury and, guided by leading questions from Archer,
told his story. Prior to deliberations, Archer minimized the se-
riousness of Bario's offense and advised the grand jury, un-
truthfully, that the arresting officer's observations might have
been insufficient to justify the arrest. The grand jury returned
no indictment.33
Klein, Archer, and Wasserberger were ultimately convicted
of violating the Federal Travel Act by utilizing interstate facili-
ties to commit unlawful activities.34 The court of appeals, how-
ever, reversed on the narrow ground of insufficient proof.35
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Friendly went beyond
this narrow ground to criticize, in dicta, the prosecution's un-
dercover techniques. "We do not at all share the Government's
30. Klein advised Bario that, under the circumstances, "'the only thing
then left to do was to have the grand jury return no indictment"' but that this
would cost money-" 'probably between $10,000 and $15,000 in cash."' Wasser-
berger later informed Bario that part of the money would have to go to the
Queens assistant district attorney who would present the case to the grand
jury. Id.
31. The three men concocted a story whereby Bario would testify that he
worked for a Las Vegas hotel and was obliged to carry a pistol, for which he
had a Nevada license. Id. at 674.
32. Id.
33. Bario claimed that he was unaware that the Nevada license was invalid
in New York. When one of the grand jurors asked Archer whether he had veri-
fied the existence of the Nevada pistol permit, Archer responded that he had.
Id.
34. The predicate for federal jurisdiction was three telephone calls: a call
from Klein returning a call from Bario in Newark, New Jersey; unsuccessful at-
tempts by Wasserberger to reach Bario in Las Vegas; and a call to Klein from
Bario from Paris. Id. at 673-74.
35. Id. at 672. The court found that the three telephone calls were "*insuffi-
cient to transform this sordid, federally provoked incident of local corruption
into a crime against the United States." Id. at 683. The court concluded that
Klein's return calls to Bario were outside the purview of the federal act be-
cause the communication was "totally fabricated" by the government. Id. at
681. Wasserberger's calls to Las Vegas also were "provoked" by the govern-
ment and, moreover, could not have promoted any unlawful activity since Bario
merely used the hotel number as a ruse and was not a guest there. Id. at 682.
Finally, leaving open the question of whether a call from an undercover agent
can ever meet the requirement of the Act, the Court said that the Paris call
from Bario was a casual occurrence; a call from New York could have served its
purpose equally well. Id. at 682-83. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808
(1971); United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958
(1969).
[Vol. 66:567
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pride in its achievement of causing the bribery of a state assis-
tant district attorney by a scheme which involved lying to New
York police officers and perjury before New York judges and
grand jurors; the federal prosecutor ... went beyond any
proper prosecutorial role,"36 and "authorized [agents] to en-
gage in crimes under New York law."37
Since the government had not implanted the criminal de-
sign in the minds of the defendants, Judge Friendly concluded
that they could not raise the defense of entrapment. But a judi-
cial rebuke for the undercover tactics employed in Archer was
nonetheless apparent. Judge Friendly went on to distinguish
this case from the typical federal narcotics undercover investi-
gation, in which agents posing as prospective purchasers in-
duce a sale of drugs.38 According to Friendly, government
agents in a narcotics investigation do not commit independent
crimes of their own.39 In Archer, however, government agents
did commit crimes independent of the criminal acts for which
the defendants were prosecuted.40 In conclusion, Judge
Friendly observed: "[T] here is certainly a limit to allowing gov-
ernmental involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for
example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies
and beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other mem-
bers of a gang of hoodlums." 41
The Archer case provided no sound basis for its criticism of
the staged arrest. The court did not discuss the apparent ne-
cessity for undercover penetration of the justice system.42 It
did not propose alternative procedures, nor did it say whether
it would accept some limited use of a staged arrest technique.43
Moreover, the court neither discussed nor attempted to balance
the competing harms. It did not evaluate the complex and seri-
ous problem of corruption in the justice system-starkly dram-
atized by the conduct of the Archer conspirators. 4 Nor did it
36. 486 F.2d at 672.
37. Id. at 675.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 675-76.
40. Id. at 675. The court is presumably referring to the offenses of criminal
possession of a weapon, N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 265.01-265.04 (McKinney 1974); per-
jury in the first degree, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 210.15 (McKinney 1965); and offering
a false instrument for filing in the first degree, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 175.35 (McKin-
ney 1965).
41. 486 F.2d at 676-77. Judge Friendly relied on language in United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), one of the principal entrapment decisions.
42. See text accompanying notes 288-90 infra.
43. See text accompanying notes 289-90 infra.
44. Although the seriousness of the problem would not alone justify any
1982]
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explain or examine its assumption that the deception by gov-
ernment agents necessarily constituted an adverse conse-
quence or harm to society.45 More specifically, the court, in its
broad remonstrances directed at governmental law breaking,
did not identify the substance of the crimes allegedly commit-
ted, or suggest whether they were evils or mere technicalities. 46
The court also failed to analyze satisfactorily whether the un-
dercover agent possessed a culpable mental state, or mens rea,
traditionally required for criminal behavior.47 In sum, the court
in Archer displayed a visceral repugnance for the conduct of
the law enforcement officials--conduct that clearly shocked its
conscience-without providing a well-reasoned basis for its
conclusion.
B. PEOPLE V. ARCHER
In the state proceedings that followed the dismissal of the
federal indictment, Archer was found guilty of receiving a
bribe.48 On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed his conviction,
holding that the staged arrest procedure violated neither due
process nor a sense of justice.49
The court, noting that Archer never claimed that he was
entrapped or that he was an unwilling participant in the
type of law enforcement response, it is a factor that one must consider in bal-
ancing the harm caused by the crime against the harm, if any, caused by the
government's conduct. The government made this argument, but the court did
not elaborate upon it. See 486 F.2d at 677 n.8.
45. There surely is a considerable difference between government agents
robbing and beating innocent civilians to gather evidence against a gang of
muggers-the court's vivid illustration--and the unspecified harm to the justice
system that allegedly occurred in Archer. Although the court acknowledged
different levels of offensiveness of government conduct, id. at 676, it did not ex-
plain how one can measure or discover such differences. See text accompany-
ing notes 355-62 infra.
46. See text accompanying notes 301-20 infra.
47. The court did suggest that governmental participation in narcotics of-
fenses is distinguishable from governmental participation in staged arrests be-
cause in the former case the government agent has "no criminal intent." 486
F.2d at 675. The court's assertion, however, was conclusory, and did not suggest
why criminal intent is lacking in narcotics cases but is present in Archer.
48. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1979), affd, 49 N.Y.2d
978, 406 N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). A prior
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied. See Klein v. Mur-
tagh, 44 A.D.2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622, affid, 34 N.Y.2d 988, 318 N.E.2d 606, 360
N.Y.S.2d 416 (1974).
As a result of a pretrial "investigative technique hearing," the reviewing
court had a more complete record on the issue of governmental misconduct.
People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d at 446, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
49. People v. Archer, 68 A.D.2d at 449, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
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scheme,50 did not consider those defenses. Instead, it analyzed
the case under the due process clause of the state constitution,
which "imposes higher standards on police conduct" than fed-
eral due process standards.S1 Under a state due process analy-
sis, the court considered the following four factors: whether
the government "manufactured a crime which otherwise would
not likely have occurred," or merely involved itself in ongoing
criminal activity whether the defendant's reluctance or unwill-
ingness to commit the crime was overcome by appeals to hu-
manitarian instincts such as sympathy, past friendship,
temptation of exhorbitant gain, or persistent solicitation;
whether the government's motive was "simply a desire to ob-
tain a conviction" rather than "to prevent further crime or pro-
tect the populace;" and whether the government engaged in
"criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of jus-
tice."52 In considering these factors, the court said that it
would focus on the overriding law enforcement objective of
crime prevention rather than on the officials' possible "encour-
agement of and participation in sheer lawlessness."5 3
Applying these factors to Archer's case, the court deter-
mined that no due process violation had occurred. First, the
government did not manufacture a crime that would not likely
have occurred because the defendants "were engaged in ongo-
ing criminal activity long prior to the appearance on the scene
of the government agent."5 4 In addition, Archer was not in-
volved because of any temptation, inducement, or instigation
by the government. The attorney Klein independently brought
Archer into the conspiracy as the central figure in the fix.55
Furthermore, the government acted in good faith and not for
venal reasons.56 Finally, the government did not commit
crimes 57 or engage in improper conduct inconsistent with a
50. Id. at 447, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
51. Id. at 446, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511. See N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 6 ("No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."). See
generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
52. 68 A.D.2d at 446-47, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
53. Id. (quoting People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406
N.Y.S.2d 714, 719 (1978)).
54. 68 A.D.2d at 447, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
55. Id.
56. According to the court, "the record conclusively establishes that the
government's motivation in this affair was to weed out existing corruption and
restore the integrity of the criminal justice system in Queens County." Id. at
447, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 511-512.
57. Although "taken literally," the government's conduct "could well fall,
prima facie, within the prohibitions of our Penal Law," such conduct, even if
1982]
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sense of justice. The court found that the government tried to
limit its deception to the minimum extent necessary, and con-
veyed the plan in advance to the highest-ranking state judge.
Furthermore, the deception of the grand jury was planned and
engineered by the conspirators themselves, not by the govern-
ment.58 In sum, while cautioning that it might be wiser to de-
velop judicial guidelines to circumscribe such deception, the
court found that the conduct of the law enforcement officials
was not improper.59
The state court's analysis of the staged arrest was more so-
technically criminal, was justified as a 'reasonable exercise of [the govern-
ment's] official powers, duties or functions." Id. at 448, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512. The
court referred to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975) which provides:
"[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not
criminal when: .. . [s]uch conduct is required or authorized by law or by a ju-
dicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of
his official powers, duties or functions." The Practice Commentary states that
the provision "was designed to exempt peace officers and other public servants
from criminal liability for conduct reasonably performed by them in the course
of their duties . . . such as possession of narcotics, policy slips and tear gas."
Hechtman, Practice Commentaries to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975).
See People v. Mattison, 75 A.D.2d 959, 428 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1980).
Eighteen states in addition to New Yorl have included law enforcement
justification statutes in their criminal codes. See ARu. STAT. ANN. § 41-503
(1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-701 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-17 (1977);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 704.11 (1979); GA. CODE § 26-901(b) (1978); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 703-307 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 411 (West 1979); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 503.040 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.18(1) (West 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17a, § 102 (Pamphlet 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 627.5 (1974); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-05-02 (1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(c) (2) (Page Special
Supp. 1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.195 (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 504 (Pur-
don 1973); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.21 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
401(2) (1978); WIS. STAT. § 939.45 (1979).
The Model Penal Code also includes such a provision. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
58. According to the court, this deception "constituted the very means" by
which the defendants carried out the crime. 68 A.D.2d at 448, 417 N.Y.S.2d at
512.
59. Id. at 449, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13. Following this affirmance, the New
York Court of Appeals also affirmed the defendant's conviction. See People v.
Archer, 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406 N.E.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839
(1980). Archer then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the
prosecutorial action constituting the basis for his conviction had violated due
process. The district court denied the petition without opinion, and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Archer v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 646 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981). The circuit court noted that in cases where con-
victions were reversed because of outrageous police conduct, "the
impermissible police conduct was inflicted directly upon the defendant." Id. at
47. The court expressly left open the question of whether conduct of law en-
forcement officials not inflicted directly upon the defendant-as in Archer's
case-might be outrageous enough to constitute a denial of due process. Id. In
any event, 'the conduct here at issue did not reach that leveL" Id.
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phisticated than that of the Second Circuit. Rather than
merely reacting negatively to the investigators' techniques, the
court attempted to establish meaningful criteria to evaluate the
appropriateness of the investigators' actions. Although it did
not elaborate on its suggestion of developing 'Judicial guide-
lines," its criteria provide guidelines in formulating an objective
due process analysis.60
C. NGRONE V. MURTAGH
The undercover operation in Nigrone v. Murtagh was trig-
gered by an individual who claimed he dealt directly with a
member of the judiciary to '"fx" a criminal case in New York
City.61 The New York Special Prosecutor decided to investi-
gate by infiltrating the court system with a sham case. A police
officer, using the alias "Stephen Vitale," stole approximately
$8,200 in cash from a businessman, at gunpoint.62 Vitale was
charged, arrested, and released upon paying his bail of $10,000,
set by a judge unaware of the charade.63
The prosecutor engaged another undercover agent, Mrs.
Gatti, to contact United States Customs Court Judge Paul R.
Rao, an old family friend, to enlist his help for Vitale, repre-
senting that Vitale was the son of "dear friends." Judge Rao
told Mrs. Gatti that the best way to handle the matter was to
obtain a lawyer who "knew the judge" in the case. Judge Rao
recommended his son, Paul Rao, Jr., a practicing attorney.
Gatti immediately contacted Rao, Jr., who agreed to represent
Vitale. Rao, Jr., helped Vitale prepare a phony story about how
he raised the $10,000 cash bail; advised Vitale that he would
need money to "talk to" certain people who could help
"squash" Vitale's case; discussed Vitale's case with a civil court
judge, who in turn apprised a superior court judge that there
was money to be made in the Vitale case; and informed his law
partner, Salvatore Nigrone, that "the hook was in" (a euphe-
60. See notes 229-35 infra and accompanying text.
61. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330
N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). The court did not dispute that "allegedly spe-
cific information about corruption in the criminal justice system" stimulated
the use of the technique. 46 A.D.2d at 344, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
62. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
facts in the case, see Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 344-46, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513,
513-16 (1974). See also Brief for Respondent at 6, Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d
421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
63. The prosecutor's office also contrived a false criminal record for Vitale,
indicating that he had two prior arrests. 46 A.D.2d at 345, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
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mism for a "fix") in the Vitale case.64
A grand jury subsequently indicted Vitale. Neither the
prosecutor presenting the evidence to the grand jury nor the
grand jurors were aware that the story was a fabrication and
that no actual robbery had occurred. A special anticorruption
grand jury then was convened. In testifying before that special
grand jury, the defendants lied about their prior activities. 65
Perjury indictments against Rao, Rao, Jr., and Nigrone fol-
lowed. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictments on
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct, urging specifically that
the prosecutor committed criminal acts and disgraced the crim-
inal process. The appellate division, which sustained the in-
dictments, nevertheless unanimously concurred that the
prosecutor had committed serious misconduct.66
64. Id. at 344-46, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16.
65. The Raos and Nigrone waived immunity and testified to their knowl-
edge and participation in the '%x." Their perjury became apparent when the
prosecutor introduced into evidence several incriminating conversations that
the government had surreptitiously taped and recorded. Id. at 346, 362 N.Y.S.2d
at 516.
Judge Rao was indicted on two counts of perjury in the first degree for de-
nying that he ever told Gatti (1) how to handle her problem in affecting a
judge's actions in a criminal case; and (2) that the bail problem could be han-
dled by getting a lawyer who knew the judge. Record on Appeal at 126-31,
Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
Rao, Jr., was indicted on seven counts of perjury in the first degree for de-
nying (1) that he had ever told Vitale that he would have to get money so that
he would "know how to talk" to other people who could question his case;
(2) that he had seen a judge, other than the judge presiding in the case, about
the Vitale case; (3) that he had ever seen anyone in the court system to obtain
assistance in the Vitale case; (4) that he had ever discussed with Vitale or any-
one else whether a "hook was in" in the Vitale case; (5) that he helped create a
"phony" story or defense for Vitale; (6) that he had no knowledge that the bail
money was the proceeds of the robbery; and (7) that Vitale had never told him
that his parents had not furnished the bail. Id. at 164-80.
Nigrone was indicted on one count of perjury in the first degree for testify-
ing that he had never asked Rao, Jr., if the "hook was in" in the Vitale case. Id.
at 112-14.
66. The court wrote:
There is no doubt whatsoever that, upon the facts here presented,
the office of Special Prosecutor has exceeded its proper prosecutorial
function. The deception of grand jurors, Judges and Assistant District
Attorneys and the filing of false official documents are absolutely intol-
erable. The criminal justice system operates to protect the individual
from both unsubstantiated accusations of guilt and illegal or outra-
geous conduct by an overreaching prosecutor. It is an impartial arbiter,
exercising its judgment, for the most part, after law enforcement au-
thorities have completed their function of detecting crime and appre-
hending the alleged criminal. When, as here, the criminal justice
system is made an unwitting accomplice of an overzealous prosecutor,
before the fact, its impartiality is destroyed and contempt for the law
encouraged.
46 A.D.2d at 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
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The court objected most to the presentation of the fictitious
case to the grand jury, since the purpose was not for a determi-
nation of whether Vitale had committed a crime or to exoner-
ate him of an accusation, but rather to legitimize his
undercover role as a criminal facing prosecution, and to allow
the defendants to influence the case corruptly.67 Having
broadly condemned the misconduct of the prosecutor,68 how-
ever, a majority of the court held that the perjury indictments
were valid.69 Given the important public interest in uncovering
corruption, and the corresponding duty of all citizens to assist
the grand jury in arriving at the truth, "[n]o person called
before a duly constituted Grand Jury may be permitted to have
any excuse to lie."7 0 Moreover, the court did not find the case
so egregious that it violated due process. The prosecutor
neither manufactured nor participated in the defendants' per-
jury. Although he induced them to commit bribery, "that con-
duct was negligible once the Special Grand Jury entered the
picture. It was then that a new and independent inexcusable
wrong was allegedly committed."7 1
The two dissenting judges shared the majority's outrage at
the "Javert type techniques" of the prosecutor, particularly his
'profanation of the sacred institution-the Grand Jury."72 The
dissent catalogued at least ten crimes that the prosecutor may
have committed,73 and criticized the prosecutor's motive in
67. Id. at 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 517. The court felt that such a misuse of the
justice system was "illegal, outrageous and intolerable." Id.
68. The court noted that "[i]f the justice system is to have any usefulness,
it must be respected and believed. The necessary confidence cannot be pre-
served when Grand Juries and Judges are duped in charades composed of lies
and deceptions fabricated by the law officers of the State." Id.
69. Id. at 348, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
70. Id. at 348-49, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
71. Id. at 350, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 519. Noting that the defendants never
claimed they were illegally entrapped, or that the government violated any of
their personal constitutional rights, the court refused to extend the exclusion-
ary rule. See Wong Sun v. United States, 372 U.S. 471 (1963).
72. 46 A.D.2d at 355, 359, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 524, 528. For a history of the grand
jury, see 1 J. CrrTy, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMNAL LAw 305-24 (5th
Am. ed. 1847); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 321-23 (7th rev.
ed. 1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151 (2d
ed. 1901). For a history of the grand jury in America, see I. YOUNrER, THE PEO-
PLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURy IN TE UNITED STATES 1634-1941 (1963).
Modem commentators, however, have viewed the grand jury as a legal
fiction, clothing with respectability, neutrality, and independence what are in
truth the actions of the prosecutor. See M. FRANKEL & G. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND
JuRy 21-23 (1977). See also Gershman, The "Perjury Trap," 129 U. PA L. REv.
624, 630-33 (1981).
73. 46 A.D.2d at 352, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The alleged crimes included per-
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summoning the defendants before the grand jury.74 The dis-
senters, however, unlike the majority, would have dismissed
the indictments. Quoting from Rochin v. Calfornia,75 a case in
which the Supreme Court reversed, on due process grounds, a
state narcotics conviction because the evidence was forcibly ex-
tracted from the defendant's stomach, the dissenting judges
concluded that the behavior of the prosecutor violated due pro-
cess since the prosecutor did "'more than offend some fastidi-
ous squeamishness or private sentimentalism about
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks
the conscience.'- 76 The dissent noted that due process, al-
though usually applied to trial procedures, has recently been
extended to cover pretrial investigative procedures, particularly
if the exclusionary rule fails to provide an effective remedy.77
There was a considerable difference, according to the dissent,
between undercover investigations of criminal projects actually
in progress and infiltration into ostensibly innocent institu-
tions.78 The dissent also disagreed with, but did not elaborate
upon, the majority's assertion that there was no violation of the
defendants' constitutional or other cognizable rights.79
Upon reading the majority and dissenting opinions,80 one is
jury in the first degree, forgery in the second degree, offering a false instrument
for filing in the first degree "and various misdemeanors." Id.
74. The dissent claimed that the prosecutor attempted to "set... up" the
defendants. Id. at 355, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
75. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
76. 46 A.D.2d at 356, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 525 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. at 172; see text accompanying note 179 infra.
77. Id. The dissent cited United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1974). In Toscanino, the court remanded the case for a hearing regarding alle-
gations that the defendant was forcibly brought into the United States after be-
ing kidnapped and tortured. Id. at 281.
78. The opinion noted.
Infiltration by deceit without the utilization of the judicial process may
well be necessary in the never ending and legitimate war against
crime, but despoilation of the fountain of justice itself must be refused
sanction as violative of every sense of decency, enlightened public pol-
icy and a due regard for the observance of good morals and ethical
conduct.
46 A.D.2d at 355, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id. at 358, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 527. The dissent also disputed, without elabo-
ration, the majority's attempt to "erect a Berlin wall" between the Vitale case,
and the subsequent perjury indictments. Id.
80. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed on procedural grounds, with-
out reviewing the merits of the criticized conduct. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36
N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
After this affirmation, the case was vigorously litigated. Actions for declar-
atory and injunctive relief by Rao and Rao, Jr., brought in the District Court for
the Southern District of New York were dismissed. Rao v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ.
2376 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1975); Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No. 75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
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struck by the authors' unusually hyperbolic and vituperative
language. The Second Circuit's language in Archer, in contrast,
is restrained. One would not expect this expression of outrage
by the same state appellate court that affirmed the conviction
in Archer; the facts in the two cases are not sufficiently dissimi-
lar to call for such markedly different characterizations of the
prosecutor's conduct.
Like the Second Circuit in United States v. Archer, the
court in Nigrone did not satisfactorily analyze its criticism of
the prosecutor's commission of crimes. The court failed to ex-
amine the necessity for the procedure and whether alternative
techniques were available to gather evidence of corruption in
the court system. The court's emotional rhetoric also pre-
cluded a dispassionate discussion of the specific harm that the
prosecutor's conduct occasioned, and whether that harm was
outweighed by the uncovering of corruption. Moreover, the
court did not explain why it is any less criminal for a govern-
ment officer to participate in narcotics or counterfeiting con-
spiracies than to infiltrate the court system.
Two doctrinal limits that might provide the principled and
rigorous analysis so apprently lacking in the several judges'
outraged opinions were raised, but never developed in these
decisions. The first of these limits, the doctrine of entrap-
ment,81 requires an analysis of both the particular undercover
technique employed and the general policies that questionable
undercover tactics advance or disserve. The second doctrine,
due process,82 offers an even more particular analytical frame-
30, 1975). In a subsequent action, the Extraordinary Special and Trial Term dis-
missed the indictments on Dec. 2, 1975, predicating its decision upon the pres-
entation of allegedly improper evidence to the grand jury that indicted the
defendants. On appeal, however, the indictments were reinstated. People v.
Rao, 53 A.D.2d 904, 386 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1976).
The defendants then renewed their motions to dismiss the indictments in
the trial court. The court granted Rao's motion, finding that the evidence to
support the two perjury counts was insufficient. People v. Rao, 177 N.Y.L.J.,
March 17, 1977, at 14-15 (Kings County N.Y. Sup. Ct.). The court denied mo-
tions to dismiss as against Rao, Jr., and Nigrone. Nigrone's indictment was sub-
sequently dismissed on the ground that electronically recorded evidence
necessary to prove the perjury was improperly sealed and therefore required
suppression. People v. Rao, Jr., 177 N.Y. L.J., September 13, 1977, at 12.
A jury later convicted Rao, Jr., of perjury in the third degree. See N.Y. PE-
NAL LAw § 210.05 (McKinney 1965). This conviction was reversed on grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct amounting to a violation of due process. People v.
Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1980).
81. See notes 83-169 infra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 170-263 infra and accompanying text.
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work for isolating and balancing the elements of harm,
prosecutorial good faith, and unfairness.
H. ENTRAPMENT AND THE STAGED ARREST
Entrapment is one of the most confusing and controversial
legal doctrines. 83 Unknown at common law,84 it evolved into a
substantive criminal defense only in the last fifty years.85 The
word itself should not connote sinister and legally unaccept-
able behavior on the part of government officials in luring citi-
zens into crime.8 6 The courts consistently have recognized that
it is permissible-and often indispensable-for government offi-
cials to contrive traps and to utilize deception to obtain evi-
dence of crime. 87 Entrapment becomes unlawful and
constitutes a defense only when governmental officials entice
innocent persons into crime.88 Thus, the critical inquiries are
the nature of the enticement and the character of the person
enticed. Neither of these issues is easily resolved. In examin-
83. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA.
L. REV. 245, 263 (1942); Note, "The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat'"-The
Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YAL.E L.J. 942, 943 (1965).
The doctrine of entrapment has inspired an immense body of scholarly
literature. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MImN. L REV. 163, 167 n.13
(1976), in which the author catalogues numerous commentaries on the subject.
84. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its His-
tory, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.FL. REv. 243, 244 (1967); Mikell, supra note
83, at 245-46.
85. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), the Supreme Court first
discussed the validity of entrapment, its theoretical basis, and its procedural el-
ements. The Court had adverted to the doctrine earlier in Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1928), but had not discussed it thoroughly.
In United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688),
apparently the first federal case in which a court considered the doctrine, the
court decided the case, not on the ground of entrapment, but on the ground
that the defendant's acts did not come within the statutory prohibition. In Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915), a federal court held, for the first
time, that defendants were entitled to an acquittal, when government agents
repeatedly solicited them to commit the crime with which they were charged.
86. See People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 802, 264 P.2d 521, 525 (1953) ("It is
not the entrapment of a criminal upon which the law frowns, but the seduction
of innocent people into a criminal career.") (quoting People v. Schwartz, 109
Cal. App. 2d 450, 455, 240 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1952)); R. PERKINS, CRIMNAL LAW 1031
(2d ed. 1969). Law enforcement officials are permitted to 'rap... the unwary
criminal" but are not permitted to "trap... the unwary innocent." Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); United
States. v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999
(1971).
88. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958); Casey v.
United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423-24 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ing entrapment, this Article will provide a brief overview of the
law of entrapment, and discuss its application to undercover
tactics in general, and to the staged arrest in particular.
A. THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT
Although some lower courts had long mentioned entrap-
ment in dicta and had accepted it as a defense,89 the Supreme
Court first considered the doctrine in 1932.90 Since then, the
Court has closely reexamined entrapment in three other
cases.91 From this concise body of law, it is possible to isolate
the elements, rationale, scope, and procedure of the defense.
The four cases involved defendants convicted of contraband vi-
olations. 92 In each case, a government agent either instigated
the defendant's criminal behavior or infiltrated ongoing crimi-
nal activity.
In Sorrells v. United States,9 3 the Supreme Court, in revers-
ing a conviction for illegal sale of liquor, held that under the
circumstances, a defense of entrapment was available as a
question of fact and should have been submitted to the jury.94
The undisputed proof on the issue of entrapment showed that a
federal prohibition agent visited the defendant and repeatedly
asked him for liquor.95 Eventually, after the agent had ingrati-
ated himself with the defendant, the defendant acquiesced.96
Additional proof showed that the defendant strenuously re-
sisted the agent's importuning, had a good character, and was
not involved in the liquor business. In rebuttal, government
witnesses testified that the defendant had the "general reputa-
89. See note 85 supra.
90. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
91. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The Supreme
Court considered entrapment in several other decisions, but never reviewed its
substantive or procedural aspects. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Liewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
92. The large majority of cases raising the entrapment defense involve con-
traband violations. See Park, supra note 83, at 223 n.198, 230 n.223. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has not closely examined the limits of the entrapment defense
in a noncontraband case. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring).
93. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
94. Id. at 452.
95. Id. at 439-40.
96. Aware that the defendant was a World War veteran and a member of
the same division as the agent had served in, the agent engaged him in conver-
sation about common war experiences. Id.
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tion of a rum-runner."97
Agreeing that entrapment was a valid defense, a majority
of the Court formulated a two-part test. The first element of
the test focuses on the behavior of the government official and
requires some form of governmental inducement of the defend-
ant's act.98 By contrast, the second element focuses on the de-
fendant's character and mental state-the defendant must be a
law-abiding citizen with no predisposition toward the crime.99
This formulation has been termed the "subjective" test of en-
trapment because it is primarily concerned with the character
and mental state of the defendant.oo
The Court based its rationale for the defense on three theo-
ries. First, the Court invoked estoppel principles, refusing to
allow the government to prosecute a defendant for a crime it
instigated.101 Second, the Court said that it would be against
public policy to prosecute a defendant under these circum-
stances; the Court had to stop the prosecution "to protect [the
government] from the illegal conduct of its officers and to pre-
serve the purity of its courts.10 2 Third, the Court relied on
statutory construction, claiming that the statute defining the
crime in question could not have been intended to apply if gov-
97. Id. at 441.
98. The Court used the words "instigated," "lured," "repeated and persis-
tent solicitation," and "[took] advantage of sentiment aroused," to characterize
the actions of the government official. Id.
99. In the language of the opinion, the second element is satisfied when a
defendant, such as Sorrells, has "no previous disposition to commit [the
crime]," is an "industrious," "law-abiding citizen," has no "criminal design," is
"an innocent person" against whom the government "originates" the "criminal
design" and then "implant[s] in the mind of [the] innocent person the disposi-
tion to commit the alleged offense." Id. at 441-42.
100. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). Others have called this test the "federal defense," the "genesis of the
criminal designs" formula, or the "origin of the criminal intent" formula. See
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091, 1102 (1951); Park, supra note 83, at 165-66.
This formulation is the rule in the federal courts and all but seven state ju-
risdictions. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal.3d 675, 689, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 459, 467 (1979) (listing the jurisdictions that have rejected the federal
rule).
101. 287 U.S. at 452. The Court never seriously disputed that the defendant
possessed the requisite actus reas and mens rea necessary for criminal liabil-
ity. Id. at 445-46. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 175-
76 (1972).
The Supreme Court suggested a distinction between estoppel and entrap-
ment in two other cases, Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), and Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). See Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal
Cases, 78 YALEn LJ. 1046 (1969).
102. 287 U.S. at 446.
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ernent officials abused their power by luring innocent per-
sons into committing crimes just to punish them.03
In a separate opinion joined by Justices Brandeis and
Stone, Justice Roberts proposed a different formulation of the
defense. This alternative test only asks whether the govern-
ment official instigated the crime, and does not focus upon the
alleged innocence of the defendant.104 This formulation has
been termed the "objective" test of entrapment because it is
primarily concerned with the government's method of captur-
ing criminals.105 The rationale for the doctrine lies not in a
"strained and unwarranted" interpretation of a statute that ren-
ders guiltless defendants whose criminal acts, coupled with
their intent to do the acts, plainly brings them within the statu-
tory definition of the crime.10 6 Rather, "the true foundation of
the doctrine [is] in the public policy which protects the purity
of government and its processes.' 0 7 Viewed in this manner,
entrapment becomes a question of law for the court, and not a
jury question fraught with "false issue[s]" such as the defend-
ant's previous criminal behavior and bad reputation.08
The Supreme Court addressed the entrapment defense
again in Sherman v. United States,0 9 in a review of a narcotics
conviction. Whereas the Sorrells Court sought to establish the
elements and basis of the defense, the Sherman Court, relying
on Sorrells, decided whether the defendant proved entrapment
103. Id. at 448. Thus, "in the light of a plain public policy and of the proper
administration of justice," the defendant's acts were not within the statutory
prohibition. Id. at 451.
104. Justice Roberts stated that
[tihe applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a
crime instigated by the government's own agents. No other issue, no
comparison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty de-
fendant, has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle
of public policy.
Id. at 459.
105. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'T, supra note 101, at 371-72. The objec-
tive test has also been referred to as the "hypothetical person" defense and the
"officer's conduct" test. See Donnelly, supra note 100, at 1102; Park, supra note
83, at 165-66.
The objective test has been adopted by the Model Penal Code and the pro-
posed new Federal Criminal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962); U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAwS,
A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMNAL CODE § 702(2) (1971). Commentators on
the subject overwhelmingly have opted for the objective test. See W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, supra note 101, at 371-73; authorities cited in Park, supra note 83, at
167 n.13.
106. 287 U.S. at 456.
107. Id. at 455.
108. Id. at 458.
109. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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as a matter of law, and reassessed the proper formulation for
making that determination.
The facts in Sherman resemble those in Sorrells.110 A gov-
ernment informer named Kalchinian first met Sherman at the
office of a doctor who was treating both for narcotics addiction.
After several meetings, and after their friendship had begun to
develop, Kalchinian, claiming that he was not responding to
treatment, repeatedly asked Sherman if he knew where to ob-
tain narcotics and whether Sherman could supply him with
some. Although Sherman resisted these initial entreaties,
Kalchinian's repeated complaints of suffering eventually
caused him to acquiesce, and obtain narcotics for Kalchinian
on several occasions. Sherman did not profit financially from
these transactions. The issue of entrapment was submitted to
the jury. Sherman was convicted, and sentenced to ten years'
imprisonment."'
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
entrapment was established as a matter of law.112 The Court
disagreed, however, on the proper basis for the decision, the
disagreement paralleling the division in Sorrells. Relying on
the subjective test of the Sorrells majority, Chief Justice War-
ren, for a five-member majority, concluded it was "patently
clear" that the government agent "induced" Sherman to obtain
narcotics for him, thereby satisfying the first element of the en-
trapment test.1 13 Futhermore, the Court found that Sherman
was an "innocent party" who was "beguile [d] . . . into commit-
ting crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted,"114
thereby satisfying the second element of the defense.115 The
110. Id. at 371.
111. Id. at 372.
112. Id. at 373.
113. Id. The Court emphasized that repeated requests were necessary to
overcome Sherman's "refusal," "evasiveness," and "hesitancy" before the agent
finally obtained Sherman's "capitulation." Id. It is not clear from the opinion
to what extent these repeated requests satisfy the element of inducement or
their relevancy on the issue of predisposition.
114. Id. at 376. The Court noted. "Law enforcement does not require meth-
ods such as this." Id. Quaere whether the Court is not in fact employing a va-
riation of the objective or police-conduct test of entrapment.
115. The Court barely analyzed the issue of predispostion. It rejected the
government's argument that Sherman's two prior narcotics convictions demon-
strated his predisposition. It also rejected, in conclusory language, the govern-
ment's claim that Sherman evinced a "ready complaisance" to accede to the
agent's request. The Court noted that no evidence existed that Sherman was in
the narcotics trade; no narcotics were found in his apartment; he did not profit
from the sales to Kalchinian; and he was trying to overcome his drug habit at
the time of the events in question. Id. at 375.
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majority reaffirmed, and explicitly refused to reexamine,116 the
statutory construction rationale of the Sorrells majority."iT
Justice Frankfurter, and the three Justices who joined in
his concurring opinion, strongly disagreed with the subjective
test, arguing that it was analytically confusing, an inadequate
guide to lower courts, and divergent from the true ends of jus-
tice." 8 In a frequently quoted passage embodying the objective
formulation that he preferred, Justice Frankfurter observed:
"The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court
must direct itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings
respond, for the proper use of governmental power.""l9 Frank-
furter also noted that the court, not the jury, should decide
whether the police acted impermissibly. He argued that this is
the only way that the court can protect the integrity of its
processes from abuse by law enforcement officials, as well as
provide meaningful standards for the future guidance of official
conduct.120
Since Sherman, the Court has considerably narrowed the
defense of entrapment on two occasions. In each case, the
Court considered whether the doctrine of entrapment is avail-
able to a concededly predisposed defendant following substan-
tial government involvement and assistance in a narcotics
enterprise. In United States v. Russell,12 1 an undercover agent
infiltrated an illicit drug laboratory, gained the confidence of
the defendants, and agreed to supply an essential chemical in
return for one-half of the drug produced. 22 Russell was con-
victed, and on appeal urged that he had established entrap-
ment as a matter of law, despite his conceded predisposition,123
116. Id. at 376.
117. It agreed that "Congress could not have intended that its statutes were
to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations." Id. at 372.
118. Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 382. It is "sheer fiction," said Frankfurter, to suggest that Con-
gress did not intend its penal statutes to cover the tempting of innocent per-
sons. If such were the case, a defendant should be relieved of the
consequences of his act, whether the tempter is a private person or a govern-
ment official, and such is not the case. Id. at 379. See United States v. Burkley,
591 F.2d 903, 911 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979); United
States v. Perl, 584 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979).
120. 356 U.S. at 385.
121. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
122. Id. at 425-26. The evidence showed that the chemical supplied by the
government agent was difficult to obtain, and that the government made it
more so by inducing some chemical supply firms in the area to cease selling
the drug. Id. at 426-27.
123. Id. at 427.
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because of intolerable government participation in the criminal
activity.124 In Hampton v. United States,125 the defendant was
convicted of selling heroin. Under the defendant's version of
the transaction, the heroin that he allegedly sold to a govern-
ment agent was the same drug that the government earlier had
supplied to him through another agent. Conceding his predis-
position,1 2 6 Hampton requested an entrapment instruction that
required acquittal if the jury found the degree of governmental
participation that he alleged.127
As in Sorrells and Sherman, the Justices' votes reflected
disagreement over whether the focus of the doctrine should be
on the defendant's character or on the conduct of the govern-
ment. Using the subjective test, five Justices upheld both Rus-
sell's and Hampton's convictions, concluding that the
entrapment defense was not available to either defendant.128
Arguably, neither proved sufficient government inducement or
solicitation under the test's first element. More importantly,
both also conceded that they were predisposed to commit the
crime, thus failing to meet the second element of the test.129
The four dissenting Justices in Russell, and the three dissent-
ing Justices in Hampton, used the previously rejected objective
test, ignored the defendant's predisposition as irrelevant, and
found that the government conducted itself improperly.130 Be-
cause the defendants met the requirement of the objective test,
the dissenters would have upheld their entrapment defenses.131
An examination of these cases reveals three salient points.
First, the Court has refused to adopt the Roberts-Frankfurter
objective test that makes the entrapment defense turn on the
conduct of the government; Russell and Hampton illustrate the
Court's continued adherence to the subjective test set out by
124. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed Russell's convic-
tion on the sole ground that an undercover agent supplied an essential chemi-
cal for manufacturing the drug which formed the basis of the conviction. The
court held that as a matter of law, "a defense to a criminal charge may be
founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the crimi-
nal enterprise." United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
125. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
126. Id. at 489-90.
127. Id. at 487-88.
128. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490 (concession of predispostion
"rendered this defense unavailable"); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436
(finding of defendant's predisposition "fatal to his claim of entrapment").
129. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490; United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 436.
130. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 496-97; United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. at 436-37, 446, 449-50.
131. 425 U.S. at 497; 411 U.S. at 436, 450.
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the Sorrells majority. 3 2 Second, the Court has limited the de-
fense to a narrowly defined class of unsuspecting victims. It
emphasized that the defense of entrapment did not give the ju-
diciary unfettered power to veto any law enforcement tech-
nique it did not like, but only those that trapped innocent
victims.133 Third, the Court refused to elevate the doctrine of
entrapment, traditionally a nonconstitutional defense, 3 4 to a
constitutional level, even where the actions of law enforcement
officials violate fundamental principles of due process. 3 5 A ma-
jority of the Court indicated, however, that principles of due
process might be independently applicable if government in-
volvement in crime reached an as yet undefined "demonstrable
level of outrageousness." 36 Thus, although some support for a
more objective view of entrapment exists, the doctrinal view
currently prevailing requires the government to induce a sub-
jectively innocent, unsuspecting victim into committing a
crime.
132. The majority in Russell clearly stated: "We decline to overrule these
cases. Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been reexam-
ined in Sherman and implicitly there reaffirmed." United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 433.
133. The Russell Court noted that for a court to determine what kind and
degree of government involvement is excessive "introduces an unmanageably
subjective standard which is contrary to the holdings of this Court in Sorrells
and Sherman." Id. at 435.
134. Id. at 433. The Supreme Court noted in Russell that because the de-
fense was "not of a constitutional dimension," Congress could broaden the sub-
stantive definition if it chose to. Id. The proposed new Federal Criminal Code
would do just that. U.S. NATIONAL CommISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL LAws, A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971).
135. "he [constitutional] analogy is imperfect," said the Court. United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. In Russell and Hampton, the government offi-
cial "violated no independent constitutional right" of the defendant Hampton
v. United States, 425 U.S. at 490-91. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430.
Just as courts fashioned the exclusionary rule to deter the police from com-
mitting unlawful searches and seizures, Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
from coercing confessions, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), so might the
courts fashion a similar rule to deter investigative methods that violate funda-
mental standards of fairness. Several commentators have urged the constitu-
tionalization of the entrapment defense. See generally Note, The Viability of
the Entrapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA L REv. 655
(1974); Note, Entrapment-A Due Process Defense-What Process Is Due? 11
Sw. U.L. REV. 663 (1979); Note, The Defense of Entrapment: Next Move - Due
Process? 1971 UTAH I REV. 266; Note, supra note 83.
136. 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). Since the
three dissenting Justices in Hampton would invoke due process in cases of ex-
cessive government involvement in crime, id. at 497 (Brennan, J., Stewart, J.,
and Marshall, J., dissenting), it appears that a due process defense is available
to a predisposed defendant who has been entrapped by flagrant governmental
misconduct.
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B. ENTRAPMENT AS A LIMrrATION ON UNDERCOVER POLICE
PRACTICES
Although defendants frequently assert entrapment as a de-
fense in prosecutions resulting from undercover police activity,
the defense is rarely sustained.137 Contrary to what may be a
common perception, undercover police activity that aids and
abets the commission of crime does not necessarily qualify as
impermissible entrapment. 138 A growing body of case law in
the lower courts139 attests to the Supreme Court's view that
"entrapment is a relatively limited defense."' 40 There are two
reasons for this.
First, strong pragmatic considerations limit the use of en-
trapment. The necessity for undercover techniques and the in-
herently contradictory evidence of a defendant's predisposition
lead courts and juries to reject the defense. Certain kinds of
crime are almost impossible to detect without the use of under-
cover tactics. For example, contraband crimes such as narcot-
ics, weapons, and currency violations usually require disguised
government involvement or solicitation to gather evidence of
the criminal activity.141 This is also true of official corruption,
white collar crime, and organized crime.142 In these crimes,
there is no victim to report the crime to the police and to pro-
vide evidence of wrongdoing; there are no eyewitnesses be-
cause the criminal behavior is clandestine, and involves
conduct that is mutually beneficial to all participants; and there
is a dearth of tangible or otherwise observable proof of crime to
provide the police with clues.
Defendants also will find it difficult to prove lack of predis-
position. To raise entrapment, defendants as a practical matter
must admit to having committed the proscribed act, and must
rely instead on the excuse that the government instigated a
crime that they otherwise would not have committed.143 Yet
137. See Park, supra note 83, at 178 n.44. Park statistically demonstrates the
infrequency with which the entrapment defense is accepted. The author's ex-
perience as a prosecutor, and as a defense attorney involved in considerable
criminal litigation for fifteen years, supports this conclusion.
138. See notes 83-136 supra and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Crossman, 663 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1981);
Unites States v. Rippy, 606 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v.
Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510 (2d
Cir. 1977).
140. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
141. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
142. See id.
143. Although defendants theoretically could assert entrapment, as well as
a claim that they did not commit the proscribed act, see Scriber v. United
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the successful government official involved will undoubtedly
claim that the defendant unhesitatingly succumbed to the in-
ducement. 4 4 A jury, confronted with contradictory evidence of
the defendant's innocent predisposition, and a tacit recognition
that undercover police methods frequently are indispensable to
uncovering and prosecuting crimes,145 in practice will probably
reject such a defense.
Apart from practical reasons, the definition of entrapment
under the majority formulation, as interpreted by the courts,
gives the defense limited utility. As noted above, 4 6 in practice
this test requires defendants to prove, first, that the govern-
ment agent induced them to commit the crime, and second,
that they were not ready and willing and were not awaiting a
"propitious opportunity" to commit the crime.147 To be suc-
cessful, defendants must show a fairly significant degree of gov-
ernmental inducement. Government initiation of the crime,
without more, is usually insufficient to sustain the defense. 46
States, 4 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925), juries might view such a claim with
skepticism.
144. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
145. A widely accepted jury instruction on entrapment contains the follow-
ing passage:
For example, when the government suspects that a person is en-
gaged in the illicit sale of narcotics, it is not entrapment for a govern-
ment agent to pretend to be someone else and to offer either directly or
through an informer or other decoy to purchase narcotics from the sus-
pected person.
1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAn, FEDERAL JURY PRACTcE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09
(3d ed. 1977). See Park, supra note 83, at 176-77 n.39.
146. See notes 83-136 supra and accompanying text.
147. The test, as phrased here, is from the oft-cited passage in Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir.
1952).
148. There is considerable confusion and controversy over the degree of
proof necessary to satisfy the element of inducement. Most courts require a
defendant raising the entrapment defense to demonstrate something more than
mere solicitation. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434-37 (1963); United
States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966
(1979); United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 429 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United
States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976);
United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1001 (3d Cir. 1969). The Second Cir-
cuit, however, apparently requires no more than mere solicitation to establish
inducement. See United States v. Greenberg, 444 F.2d 369, 371 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 953 (1970); Sherman v. United States 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d
Cir. 1952).
Apart from the quantum of proof necessary to satisfy the element of in-
ducement, courts must also decide when the evidence requires them to submit
the defense of entrapment to the jury. Compare United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d
955, 959 (2d Cir. 1966) (if inducement has been shown, production by defendant
of any evidence negating predisposition requires submission of defense to
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Defendants must also offer substantial proof of their unwilling-
ness to commit the crime.149 Proof that they were ready and
willing to commit either the crime charged or a similar crime,
without the intervention of a government official, almost invari-
ably defeats the defense.150 Further, if predisposition is con-
ceded or proved-as it usually is in cases in which the
defendants are involved in criminal activitylL--courts will ap-
parently condone any amount of governmental involvement in
the crime short of conduct bordering on the patently outra-
geous. 5 2 Finally, the limited appellate review of factual issues
determined by a jury, 53 and the majority test's classification of
entrapment as a factual question, 5 4 realistically foreclose re-
versal of the verdict on grounds of entrapment except in the
most egregious cases. 5 5 Thus, both pragmatic and legal con-
jury) with United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979) (jury must be instructed on entrapment if there is any
basis in evidence for finding that government induced an otherwise unpredis-
posed person to commit crime).
149. The courts are not consistent in their definition of predisposition; they
generally require very little proof to demonstrate predisposition or, correla-
tively, substantial proof to show lack of predisposition. See United States v.
Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499,
504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978); United States v. Swets, 563 F.2d
989, 990-91 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); United States v.
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978); United States v. Spain, 536 F.2d 170, 173-74 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 833 (1977); United States v. Williams, 487 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978) ("The Government's provision of aid, incentive, and
opportunity for commission of the crime amounts to an entrapment only if it
appears that the defendant has done that which he would never have done
were it not for the inducement of Government operatives.").
151. See, e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 115-16 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1971).
152. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,48-89 (1976); United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434-36 (1973). But see United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d
373, 376-77 (3d Cir. 1978).
153. See United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting
United States v. Rangel, 572 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854
(1976)) ("'[e]ntrapment as a matter of law exists only where there is undis-
puted testimony making it patently clear that an otherwise innocent person
was induced to commit the act complained of by the trickery, persuasion or
fraud of a government agent' ") (emphasis in original); United States v. Groes-
sel, 440 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971) (evidence "Was
not so overwhelming that it was 'patently clear' or 'obvious' that [defendant]
was entrapped as a matter of law").
154. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
155. Entrapment as a matter of law was found in the following cases: Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); United States v. West, 511 F.2d
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siderations make entrapment a limited defense in actions
based on undercover police practices.
C. THE APPICABILITY OF ENTRAPMENT TO THE STAGED ARREST
From the discussion so far, it is not surprising that the de-
fense of entrapment, as traditionally formulated, apparently of-
fers very little assistance to a defendant ensnared in a staged
arrest. In United States v. Archer156 and Nigrone v. Murtagh,157
for example, the entrapment defense was not vigorously as-
serted, and the courts barely mentioned the defense. The fac-
tual settings in those cases, however, rendered entrapment
unavailable. This does not mean, of course, that entrapment
may never be raised as a defense in a staged arrest proceeding.
To analyze properly whether the entrapment defense would
ever be applicable to the staged arrest under the majority test
of entrapment, and its focus upon inducement and predisposi-
tion, one must differentiate between two levels of government
undercover activity encompassed in the staged arrest. The first
level involves the fabrication of a case. The second level in-
volves the actual solicitation of persons to engage in a corrupt
plot.
The actual implementation of the staged case-the first
level-does not appear to implicate the entrapment defense.
Although officials have designed the simulated case to permit
the investigators to observe closely corrupt behavior within the
system, they have not attempted actual solicitation of corrupt
1083, 1087 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir.
1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), affd on remand, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Bueno, 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d
441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir.
1957); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982). United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307,
1312 (C.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D.D.C.
1964); People v. Strong, 21 flL 2d 320, 326, 172 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1961); Jones v.
State, 285 So. 2d 152, 160 (Miss. 1973).
It appears, however, that Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), and
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), have overruled many of the forego-
ing cases. In United States v. McGrath, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), following the grant
of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for consideration in light of United States v. Russell. Upon remand, the court of
appeals concluded that Russell "is the controlling law.., and that the defense
of entrapment was not available to McGrath." United States v. McGrath, 494
F.2d 562, 563 (7th Cir. 1974).
156. 486 F.2d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1973).
157. 46 A.D.2d 343, 349, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 518 (1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330
N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
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behavior. Thus, they have not met the first element of the pre-
vailing test. One could argue that by penetrating the system
with a sham case, the investigators have induced judicial and
court officials to engage in routine court matters necessary to
process the case. But this is clearly not the kind of inducement
sufficient to invoke the entrapment defense. Moreover, at this
level law enforcement officials responsible for setting up the
case naturally would welcome the initiation of corrupt sugges-
tions by judges, lawyers, or other court personnel, as such be-
havior would obviate any claims that the government solicited
the offense, or that the initiator lacked predisposition.
Entrapment doctrine would, therefore, not come into play
in the staged arrest setting until the second level, when the
government actively solicits or induces criminal activities.
Once the case has entered the court network, the investigators
likely will not wait passively for an individual to make a cor-
rupt overture. More likely, either the roleplaying agents, such
as the sham defendant, the arresting officer, or another under-
cover agent perhaps posing as a friend of the defendant, will
seek to initiate contact with persons in the system in the hope
that such intervention might yield corrupt responses. The in-
vestigators in the Archer and Nigrone cases used the latter ap-
proach. In Archer, an undercover agent approached
bailbondsman Wasserberger with the aim of helping Bario;158
in Nigrone, an undercover agent posing as a friend of the fam-
ily spoke to Judge Rao about helping Vitale.159 In both cases,
these solicitations produced corrupt responses which invited
further undercover investigation. Given this form of govern-
ment inducement, some courts would hold that the defendant
has proven at least the first element of the entrapment
defense.o60
Even assuming, however, that these initial inducements
and perhaps even further governmental solicitations of others
take place, one must also consider the second critical element
of the entrapment defense, the defendant's predisposition.
Under the majority test, a showing that the defendant was
ready and willing to engage in corrupt behavior will defeat a
claim of entrapment regardless of the degree of government in-
ducement.16' Generally, in cases of white collar crime and offi-
158. 486 F.2d at 673.
159. 46 A.D.2d at 345, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
160. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
161. See text accompanying notes 128-29, 151-52 supra.
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cial corruption, the courts are extremely reluctant to accept a
defendant's claims of lack of predisposition. Some courts have
said, for example, that in cases involving receipt of bribes by
public officials, the defense of entrapment is simply unavaila-
ble.162 Similarly, in cases where an undercover agent has as-
sumed the role of a dishonest official willing to be bribed, the
courts usually find that the bribe giver was predisposed to com-
mit the offense and therefore cannot claim that he was
entrapped.163
The unwillingness of courts to accept lack of predisposition
claims in cases involving white collar crime and official corrup-
tion may be attributed to several factors. The considerations of
necessity, contradictory evidence on the element of predisposi-
tion, and the narrow legal definition of entrapment restrict the
defense's application to cases of official corruption in particular,
just as they restrict its application to undercover police prac-
tices in general.164 Entrapment is particularly difficult to assert
for defendants accused of the former type of crime because of
the positions of trust they occupy and the resulting attitude
that their conduct must be above temptation.165 Courts feel
that they must punish any breach of that trust, regardless of
the nature of the inducement. Thus, police officers who suc-
cumb to a $50,000 bribe to overlook narcotics violations may
have lacked predisposition because they would never have
taken a bribe but for the irresistable nature of the temptation.
It is unlikely, however, that a court would sustain their entrap-
ment defenses; as police officers, the defendants occupy such
important positions of public trust that they are duty bound to
resist such temptation.166
By contrast, if a similar police officer solicited the bribe
from a motorist who had been stopped for intoxicated driving,
the courts might be more receptive to a claim of entrapment by
the motorist.167 The motorist does not occupy a position of
162. State v. Dougherty, 86 NJJ 525, 534-35, 93 A. 98, 102 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on
other grounds, 88 N.J.L. 209 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
163. See United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1220-23 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950
(1974); United States v. Greenberg, 444 F.2d 369, 371-72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 853 (1971).
164. See notes 141-55 supra and accompanying text.
165. See State v. Dougherty, 86 N.JJ. 525, 535, 93 A. 98, 102 ("It is no valid
excuse, for the commission of a crime, by a person holding a public office, that
he was tempted. His integrity must be above temptation."); Donnelly, supra
note 100, at 1115. See also Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97, 98 (6th Cir. 1925).
166. See Donnelly, supra note 100, at 1115.
167. See id at 1115 n.71 and cases cited therein.
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public trust. Also, considerations of public policy might not
weigh as heavily against the motorist as they would against the
police officer who receives a bribe. The courts might not want
public officials who exercise power to offer handsome induce-
ments to vulnerable citizens to violate the law. There are dif-
ferent standards of conduct for a police officer and a private
citizen, as well as different thresholds of resistance to tempta-
tion. Moreover, there is a question of whether the arbitrary so-
licitation of bribes from motorists advances any legitimate law
enforcement interest. Finally, a motorist who initiates bribes is
easily detected and prosecuted. There is no need to use under-
cover agents to solicit such actions. Detection of corrupt acts
by police officers, in contrast, is much more difficult.
Thus, the majority formulation of entrapment would be of
limited support to a defendant charged with an offense arising
out of a staged arrest. Even if faced with egregious government
conduct, the defendant would not be able to use the defense
successfully. The minority formulation of the defense would,
however, provide a doctrinal basis for challenging such a prose-
cution. Under the latter approach, there is a critical, objective
inquiry into the methods that the government officials use to
bring about the defendant's arrest.168 Thus, a court employing
the minority test could determine that the government's con-
duct in the staged arrest was sufficiently offensive to require
dismissal of the indictment. Yet very few jurisdictions have
adopted the minority view of entrapment. 69 The only alterna-
tive, therefore, for many defendants who have been subjected
to unreasonable government treatment is reliance on a due
process analysis. The central issues under this approach, as
under a minority entrapment approach, are whether the staged
arrest is offensive or outrageous, and what standards a court
should use to make such a judgment. Unfortunately, the pres-
ent due process analysis of undercover police activities does
not adequately address these issues.
IV. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON UNDERCOVER
INVESTIGATIONS
A. THE FUNCTION OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMIwAL LAW
Due process is the constitutional mechanism for protecting
168. See text accompanying notes 104-08 &upra.
169. See notes 100, 105 supra.
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and enforcing certain moral values. 70 In the area of criminal
law one can identify two such overriding values: ensuring the
reliability of the guilt-finding process,171 and preserving the in.
tegrity of a person's body and mind.172 The first value applies
to criminal trials or other criminal proceedings in which a de-
fendant's guilt is adjudicated. The second value applies to gov-
ernmental oppression, either physical or psychological, of
individuals.
This second moral imperative is the one relevant to the
staged arrest, because the government in a staged arrest may
be unreasonably and offensively intrusive. To protect this over-
riding value in similar cases, courts have invoked due process
to limit government conduct that brutalizes, abuses, or ha-
rasses, 73 invades privacy,174 or in other ways unreasonably in-
trudes into people's lives. 75 The Bill of Rights contains specific
170. For a discussion of the early history and development of due process,
see R. Mor, DuE PROCESS OF LAW (1926). Two excellent articles examining
the role of due process in criminal law are: Kadish, Methodology and Criteria
in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE I.J. 319 (1957),
and Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048
(1968).
171. The Supreme Court has furthered this objective by using a due process
analysis to apply to the states provisions in the Bill of Rights that ensure a fair
trial and a reliable determination of guilt. See Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S 555 (1980) (first amendment right to a public trial); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to a speedy trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory
process); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (sixth amendment right to
impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to
confrontation); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962) (sixth
amendment right to notice of criminal charges), Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel). Accordingly,
due process protection has been rendered virtually co-extensive with the spe-
cific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
Apart from these specific constitutional protections, the Supreme Court
has fashioned additional protections to ensure the reliable adjudication of a de-
fendant's guilt. It has used due process to require trial before an impartial
judge, see Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972); to require
guilt to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361-64 (1970); to outlaw inflammatory or unfair prosecutorial summations,
see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); to forbid the use of fraudulent
evidence, see Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); to require disclosure of excul-
patory evidence, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); to bar the
use of irrational legal presumptions, see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
138-41 (1965); and to suppress courtroom identifications based on unfair pre-
trial lineup procedures, see Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969).
172. See notes 173-76 infra and accompanying text.
173. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974).
174. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
175. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 497 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
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provisions that parallel and reinforce this limitation on the gov-
ernment's power to oppress arbitrarily or cause harm to per-
sons.1 7 6 The Supreme Court has encountered greater doctrinal
difficulty when invoking due process to protect some relative
and indefinite concepts such as personal dignity and privacy,
than when it employs due process to protect the accuracy and
fairness of the adjudicative process. The reason for this doctri-
nal difficulty is readily apparent. To protect personal dignity
and privacy, a court may often have to restrict the ability of offi-
cials to detect and prove criminal activity.17
The classic case illustrating the due process limits on po-
lice investigation tactics is Rochin v. California. In Rochin, the
Supreme Court determined that the police officers' use of a
stomach pump to force two capsules of narcotics from the de-
fendant's stomach offended due process. 78 The Supreme
Court, in a famous opinion by Justice Frankfurter, reversed
Rochin's conviction in the state courts:
[T] he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness about combatting crime too en-
ergetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally break-
ing into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain
evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.17 9
At the time of Rochin's conviction, the only federal basis
senting); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 378-80 (3d Cir. 1978). See also
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-71 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39
(1959).
176. The fourth amendment bars the government from unreasonably
searching persons, seizing their belongings, or rummaging through their
houses, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622-32 (1886), thereby protecting
their privacy and the integrity of their bodies and minds from government inva-
sion. The fifth amendment protects criminal defendants from being involunta-
rily retried for the same crime, thereby limiting the government's power to
harass and oppress them by threatened and repeated prosecutions. See Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1937). The eighth amendment prevents the
government from inflicting cruel or unusual punishment. See Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910).
177. One of the principal reasons for the constitutional rule excluding Me-
galy seized evidence "' is to deter [the police]-to compel respect for the con-
stitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it."' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting El-
kins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). Plainly, however, while protect-
ing the privacy and integrity of the individual, this "exclusionary rule" keeps
reliable and probative evidence from the fact-finders, thereby undermining an
accurate determination of guilt.
178. 342 U.S. 165, 166, 174 (1952).
179. Id. at 172.
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for challenging state criminal justice was the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Frankfurter ac-
knowledged that standards for due process enforcement were
"indefinite and vague." 8 0 The applicable standard was
whether the police methods "'offend those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most hei-
nous offenses."'18 Just as coerced confessions were offensive
to human dignity, the methods in Rochin were offensive to "a
sense of justice."'8 2
The "evanescent standards" that the Court employed to
overturn Rochin's conviction'8 3 have served as the principal
benchmark by which the courts determine the permissible
scope of investigative methods. 84 Although Justice Frank-
furter claimed that due process was not "a matter of judicial ca-
price," 85 it is understandable that a test that depends on the
shock capacity of the consciences of particular judges has cre-
ated confusing and unpredictable results. For example, the
Supreme Court refused to sustain an action against a sheriff for
false imprisonment in a case of mistaken identity. 8 6 An erro-
neous imprisonment might give rise to a Rochin violation, how-
ever, if the sheriff "deliberately and repeatedly refused to
check the identity of a complaining prisoner against readily
available mug shots and fingerprints." 8 7 If a police officer pur-
sues and arrests a suspect out of revenge, following the dismis-
sal of a civil lawsuit that the officer brought against the suspect,
due process bars prosecution.188 Yet in a recent decision, the
Supreme Court refused to find a Rochin due process violation
where, to secure evidence, the police deliberately violated an
180. Id.
181. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
182. Id. at 173.
183. Id. at 177 (Black, J., concurring). This case illustrates the ongoing de-
bate on the court between those Justices who view due process as embodying a
philosophy of fundamental fairness to be determined by "a disinterested in-
quiry pursued in the spirit of science," id. at 172, and critics of that approach,
notably Justice Black. The latter would opt for applying to the states all of the
protections embodied in the Bill of Rights-in Rochin, the fourth and fifth
amendments-as opposed to an "accordion-like" philosophy whose "nebulous
standards," id. at 175, "have been used to nullify state legislative programs
passed to suppress evil economic practices." Id. at 177.
184. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
185. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172.
186. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
187. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
188. United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534, 537-40 (E.D. Ark. 1977).
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individual's fourth amendment rights knowing that the defend-
ant lacked standing to challenge the violation.189
In addition to creating unpredictable results, the Rochin
principle is frequently raised as a bar to conviction, but is sus-
tained only in extreme situations.190 In cases of government-
sanctioned violence, for example, illegal kidnapping and torture
may violate the Rochin due process test,191 whereas "unneces-
sary and unreasonable" violence to effectuate an arrest may
not.192 The use of force by prison guards generally does not vi-
olate due process, even if the force is excessive, 93 whereas an
unprovoked assault on a prisoner does violate due process. 94
The use of physical force in fingerprinting and including a sus-
pect in a line-up is reasonable and not shocking to the con-
science,195 whereas forcibly compelling a suspect to submit to
189. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980). See text accompa-
nying notes 374-78 infra.
190. For example, two Supreme Court cases decided shortly after Rochin
presented examples of arguably conscience-shocking police methods. In one
case, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), police investigators made repeated
illegal entries into defendant's home, where they installed a microphone which
they used to overhear incriminating conversations. Id. at 130-31. In the other
case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), at the request of police investiga-
tors, a physician inserted a hypodermic needle into the defendant's uncon-
scious body to obtain a blood sample used to convict him of vehicular
manslaughter. Id. at 433. Rochin was distinguished in both cases, in the first
because no "coercion, violence or brutality to the person" was committed, 347
U.S. at 133, and in the second because "nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' was in-
volved, 352 U.S. at 435.
Only three federal cases since 1952 have held that the Rochin standard was
expressly controlling. See LeGrande v. Redman, 423 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Del.
1976); United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198 (E.D. Wis.
1974); United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 384 (D.D.C. 1957). See also
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1974).
191. Id. at 275-76. But see United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62,
65-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Winter, 509
F.2d 975, 987-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S.
825 (1975); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 747-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 936 (1973); Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1964).
192. United States v. Lawrence, 434 F. Supp. 441, 446 (D.D.C. 1977) (shooting
fleeing suspect in the back may have been "unnecessary and unreasonable,"
but not so outrageous as to bar defendant's prosecution).
193. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); Lock v. Jenkins, 464 F. Supp. 541, 549
(N.D. Ind. 1978), modified, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981); LeGrande v. Redman, 423
F. Supp. 524, 528 (D. Del. 1976). Cf. Martinez v. Rosado, 474 F. Supp. 758, 760-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 614 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment for guard
reversed because issue of excessive force was in factual dispute).
194. Vargas v. Correa, 416 F. Supp. 266, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Mere-
dith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975).
195. Appeal of Maguire, 571 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911
(1978).
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the swabbing of a bodily organ for blood stains is shocking.96
The use of force, such as choking and pinching, to prevent a
suspect from disposing of evidence is not shocking,197 whereas
forcing a pregnant woman to submit to a body cavity search is
shocking.198
This reluctance to accept the due process argument except
in the most egregious cases may be attributable, in part, to the
difficulty in evaluting police practices where the police have in-
fringed no specific constitutional right. One court recently ob-
served: "Where the line between permissible and
impermissible police conduct is to be drawn is hard to figure
and even more difficult to express. There simply are no sharply
defined standards in this area." 99 An added reason for this re-
luctance is the view of some courts that the Constitution en-
trusts law enforcement to the executive branch, and that in the
absence of a violation of a specifically protected right, the judi-
ciary should not exercise "a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law en-
forcement practices of which it did not approve."200
Under the Rochin standard, government conduct that is
brutal, offensive, or "shocks the conscience" may violate due
process. Relying on this subjective test, courts have handed
down varied and unpredictable rulings, generally finding a vio-
lation of due process only in the most flagrantly offensive situa-
tions. As this Article points out below, 201 courts use this same
subjective test in cases involving undercover police practices
and, therefore, hand down similarly unpredictable rulings
which fail to guide the subsequent courts that also must ana-
lyze governmental misconduct.
B. DUE PROCESS AND UNDERCOVER POLICE PRACTICES
1. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court occasionally has referred to constitu-
tional limitations on undercover police conduct, particularly in
196. United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1957).
197. People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1975); State v. Santos, 101 N.J. Super. 98, 243 A.2d 274 (1968); State v. Young, 15
Wash. App. 581, 550 P.2d 689 (1976).
198. United States ex tel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (E.D.
Wis. 1974).
199. United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534, 539 (E.D. Ark. 1977).
200. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). The Supreme Court
has on occasion, however, specifically suggested that the executive branch take
disciplinary measures against offending officials. See United States v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 733-34 n.5 (1980); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954).
201. See notes 202-63 infra and accompanying text.
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the context of entrapment analysis. In Sherman v. United
States, the Court sustained the defendant's entrapment de-
fense,202 and compared undercover methods that entice inno-
cent persons into crime with coerced confessions and unlawful
searches, 203 implying that all such practices are uniformly ob-
jectionable because they involve government misconduct
flagrantly offensive to the dignity of the individual.204 On two
other occasions the Supreme Court declared that certain types
of government behavior-described as "the most indefensible
sort of entrapment by the State"--amounted to a violation of
due process. 20 5 In Raley v. Ohio,206 the Court held that due
process barred the conviction of persons for refusing to answer
questions before a state investigating commission because the
defendants relied upon the government's assurances that they
had a constitutional privilege to refuse to answer.207 In Cox v.
Louisiana,208 the Court held that due process precluded the
conviction of the defendant for disorderly conduct for picketing
"near" a courthouse in violation of a local ordinance when gov-
ernment officials advised the defendant that such a demonstra-
tion would be lawful and not covered by the terms of the
statute.209
Although these cases present analytical difficulties under
entrapment doctrine, 210 they demonstrate that the Court sees a
relationship between unfair and deceptive government behav-
202. 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958).
203. Id. at 372. When the government entices an innocent person into
crime, "stealth and strategy become as objectionable police methods as the co-
erced confession and the unlawful search." Id.
204. Indeed, the language in some of the entrapment decisions characteriz-
ing the government's behavior is reminiscent of the language used in Rochin,
i.e., conduct that is "shocking to the sense of justice," Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932), "abhorrent," id. at 449, and "lawless," Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurther, J., concurring), clearly
suggesting that due process considerations are relevant, as they should be, in
cases of excessive police involvement in crime.
205. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,
438-39 (1959).
206. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
207. Id. at 437-39.
208. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
209. Id. at 568-71. For a discussion of whether Raley and Cox are predi-
cated on entrapment, as opposed to estoppel principles, see Note, supra note
101, at 1046-51.
210. The government did not disguise its official identity in either case, nor
did government officials induce the defendants to commit what the defendants
believed were criminal offenses. Moreover, in contrast with traditional entrap-
ment principles, the Court specifically found in Raley, and intimated in Cox,
that there was no official intent to deceive. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 571;
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 438. In Raley, however, the Court noted that "[t]here
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ior and the due process clause. The cases suggest, at least in
theory, that certain "entrapment-like" practices might violate
due process; yet in all of the foregoing opinions, because the
Court found that the entrapment defense was valid, it had no
occasion to rule on the validity of a due process analysis if the
entrapment defense were unavailable. In United States v. Rus-
sell, the Court faced the latter situation. The undercover agent
in Russell infiltrated a drug ring, provided the conspirators with
a key ingredient necessary for manufacturing the drug, and
even participated in the manufacturing process. 21' The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction be-
cause, in its view, fundamental concepts of due process pro-
tected against "an intolerable degree of governmental
participation in [a] criminal enterprise" carried out by "over-
zealous law enforcement." 212
Reversing the circuit court, a narrow majority of the
Supreme Court believed that the questionable practices were
justified. It reasoned that the government invaded no protected
rights of the accused nor violated any laws.2 13 Moreover, the
defendant's proclivity toward crime, essential to overcoming an
entrapment defense, was conceded. 214 The Court's passing ref-
erence, in dictum, to the due process claim is significant. Spe-
cifically citing the Rochin case, the Court announced: "[W]e
may some day be presented with a situation in which the con-
duct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due pro-
cess principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction."215 The in-
stant case, however, was "distinctly not of that breed."216
Under this frequently quoted language in Russell,217 a judge
was active misleading" by the government, implying that the defendants were
not criminally predisposed but, on the contrary, law-abiding citizens. Id.
211. 459 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972). See note 122 supra and accompanying
text.
212. Id. at 673-74.
213. The Court noted that "the Government's conduct here violated no in-
dependent constitutional right of the respondent. Nor did Shapiro violate any
federal statute or rule or commit any crime in infiltrating the respondent's drug
enterprise." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430.
214. Id. at 433.
215. Id. at 431-32 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 432.
217. Post-Russell decisions reviewing undercover police methods often refer
to this dictum as a basis for invoking due process. See, e.g., United States v.
Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United
States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Register, 496
F.2d 1072, 1081 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676 (2d Cir.
1973).
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may find a due process violation if, in the judge's opinion, the
government's conduct is sufficiently "outrageous." Thus, Rus-
sell not only provided a more precise, albeit subjective test of
due process in a case involving undercover police practices, it
also intimated that a court may find a due process violation
even if a defendant is predisposed to commit the crime and an
entrapment defense is, therefore, unavailable.
At first glance, the Court in Hampton v. United States ap-
parently rejected the Russell dictum, and ruled that if the de-
fendant cannot prove entrapment, there can be no due process
violation.218 In Hampton, an undercover agent provided Hamp-
ton with drugs which he then was induced to sell to other un-
dercover agents. Although several lower courts found similar
conduct repugnant enough to violate due process, 219 a bare ma-
jority in Hampton upheld the conviction. The Court found first
that entrapment was unavailable because the defendant con-
ceded that he was predisposed,220 and, second, that due process
was not implicated.22 ' The three Justices in the Hampton plu-
rality appeared to conclude that a due process analysis is inap-
plicable if a defendant is predisposed.=2 2 The two concurring
and the three dissenting Justices, however, seemed to endorse
the use of a due process analysis in cases of very extreme gov-
ernmental misconduct, even if the defendant is predisposed.223
218. 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976).
219. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Mc-
Grath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), affid on remand,
494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Chisurn, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.). Cal. 1970).
220. 425 U.S. at 490.
221. Id. at 490-91. Five Justices, including a three-Justice plurality consist-
ing of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, and concur-
rences from Justices Powell and Blackmun, found that due process was not
violated. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented, finding that due
process was violated. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision.
222. Id. at 488-89.
223. The concurring Justices rejected the view that due process is unavaila-
ble if entrapment cannot be sustained because of the defendant's predisposi-
tion. Referring to Judge Friendly's statement in United States v. Archer, 486
F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973), that it would be "unthinkable" to permit the gov-
ernment, in effect, to join a gang of hoodlums and practice violence on innocent
citizens, Justices Powell and Blackmun suggested that in a clear case of exces-
sive government overinvolvement in crime, as perhaps in the Archer case, due
process could bar prosecution. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. at 493 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring). The concurring Justices recognized the doctrinal and prac-
tical difficulties in defining the limits of police involvement in crime when
predisposition is not an issue. Id. at 494-95 n.6. Nevertheless, they noted that
judgments of fairness and the identification of appropriate standards of police
behavior are implicit in the concept of judicial review, and must be made even
if predisposition is conceded. Id. at 495. Cases in which proof of predisposition
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Thus, the Supreme Court seems to allow defendants to
prove a due process violation despite their concession that they
cannot establish entrapment. This result is necessary to guard
adequately against governmental overreaching. The appropri-
ate test, however, is the subjective test that the Court endorsed
in Russell. As noted above,224 such a test is vague, leads to un-
predictable results, and gives little guidance to courts facing
similar situations in the future.
2. The Lower Courts
a. Contraband Cases
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply detailed
due process limitations to police conduct, some recent lower
court decisions present a more sophisticated analytical frame-
work by which to measure, under the due process clause, the
permissible limits of government investigation. In People v.
Isaacson,225 the police arrested a heavy drug user named
Breniman for possession of narcotics, and used physical force
and the threat of prosecution to coerce him into participating in
an undercover investigation, even though the police knew, but
did not reveal, that the capsules he had possessed were not
narcotic substances. Under this compulsion, Breniman tele-
phoned an acquaintance, Isaacson, to beg for drugs to finance
his legal fees. Breniman telephoned the reluctant Isaacson
seven times, sobbing and pleading, before Isaacson finally
is not dispositive "will be rare." Id. at 495 n.7. Moreover, "[p]olice overinvolve-
ment in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness
before it could bar conviction." Id.
The dissenting opinions in Russell and Hampton would have invoked both
due process and the minority approach to entrapment to reverse the convic-
tions. Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, if one combines the
concurrence's endorsement of the Russell dictum and the dissent's willingness
to invoke due process, it seems fair to conclude that a majority of the Supreme
Court views due process as a permissible means of controlling certain outra-
geous kinds of undercover activities, even if entrapment is inapplicable.
As one might imagine, however, the Hampton decision plainly has had an
inhibiting effect on lower federal courts that earlier had relied on due process
to bar prosecutions. Courts that had invoked due process reversed themselves,
United States v. McGrath, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974), and routinely affirmed
subsequent convictions raising colorable due process claims on appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975
(1979); United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978);
United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Register,
496 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974).
224. See notes 183-98 supra and accompanying text.
225. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
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agreed to provide Breniman with cocaine.226 At the trial, the
defendant's entrapment claim was rejected because he had not
proved lack of predisposition. He was then convicted.
Branding the police conduct "inexplicable" and "reprehen-
sible,"227 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that due pro-
cess mandated dismissal of the indictment. Unlike the
Supreme Court in Russell, the New York court did more than
just characterize the government's conduct as "outrageous"
without analyzing its conclusion. Instead, it isolated four fac-
tors that, "viewed in totality," demonstrated "a brazen and con-
tinuing pattern in disregard of fundamental rights."228 First,
the court found that the police manufactured a crime that
would not likely have occurred, rather than merely involving
themselves in ongoing criminal activity.229 Second, the police
engaged in serious misconduct "repugnant to a sense of jus-
tice."2 30 Apart from the violence they practiced on Breniman,
the refusal of the police to reveal that the capsules found on
Breniman were innocuous substances was "deceptive, dishon-
est and improper."231 Third, the government engaged in persis-
tent solicitation and appeals to sympathy to overcome
defendant's reluctance.232 Fourth, the police demonstrated an
overriding desire to obtain a conviction as an end in itself, with-
out any indication of a desire to prevent further crime, for ex-
ample, by cutting off the source of the narcotics. 233
These four factors are the same factors applied by a lower
New York court in People v. Archer to find a staged arrest valid,
and not violative of due process.234 As in that case, the four cri-
teria were helpful in sorting out the facts to determine, in a
more objective manner, whether the state's conduct was suf-
ficiently flagrant to bar the prosecution. There may, however,
be other factors, which this Article examines below,235 that
would make the analysis even more complete.
In another narcotics case in which the reversal of a convic-
226. Id. at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
227. Id. at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
228. Id. at 523, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
229. "[A] crime of this magnitude would not have occurred without active
and insistent encouragement and instigation by the police and their agent." Id.
at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
230. Id. at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 522-23, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
234. 68 A.D.2d 441, 446-47, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (1979). See note 52 .supra and
accompanying text.
235. See notes 389-395 infra and accompanying text.
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tion rested on due process grounds, the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, in United States v. Twigg,23 6 focused on the
government's excessive involvement in the crime. In Twigg, as
in Isaacson, the government enlisted the cooperation of a nar-
cotics offender named Kubica to help apprehend other drug
traffickers. 23 7 The government set up and supplied the chemi-
cal ingredients for a "speed laboratory." The defendants were
brought into the operation for financial reasons. Otherwise,
they played a minor role, and provided little assistance. As a
result of their participation they were convicted of illegally
manufacturing a controlled substance.
The court of appeals first determined that this was not a
case of entrapment because the prosecution had sufficiently
proved the defendants' predisposition.23 8 The court found,
however, that the extent of the police immersion in the crime
"was so overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as
a matter of due process of law."239 The court distinguished
Hampton, the Supreme Court case that did not find a due pro-
cess violation in similar circumstances, on two grounds. Hamp-
ton concerned an illegal sale rather than the illegal
manufacture of drugs.240 Also, unlike Hampton, government
agents in Twigg "conceived and contrived" the crime rather
than simply supplying ingredients or the contraband itself.241
In justifying its conclusion that there was a due process vi-
olation, the court used the subjective test found in Russell and
Hampton and found that the instant case reached "a demon-
strable level of outrageousness." 242 Yet the court also analyzed
this conclusion in more detail, suggesting several factors that
led to its holding. First, the defendants had no apparent crimi-
nal designs, and they lacked the expertise to set up a labora-
tory without government assistance. 243 Moreover, the
government initiated, established, and directed a criminal oper-
ation rather than investigating an existing narcotics labora-
236. 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
237. Kubica was arrested by federal agents in 1976 for illegally manufactur-
ing drugs. He pleaded guilty to one felony count and received a four-year sen-
tence. He previously had been convicted in state courts of similar charges. Id.
at 375.
238. Id. at 376.
239. Id. at 377.
240. The court noted that since selling drugs is "a much more fleeting and
elusive crime to detect than the operation of an illicit drug laboratory," the gov-
ernment is required to use "more extreme methods of investigation." Id. at 378.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 380.
243. Id. at 381 n.9.
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tory.244 Finally, the government generated new crimes merely
to press criminal charges.2 45
Isaacson and Twigg appear to be the only post-Russell
cases involving contraband prosecutions that reversed convic-
tions on due process grounds. In both cases, the courts at least
attempted to go beyond Russell's broad standard. Although
they are not complete in their analyses, they point out the di-
rection toward which courts must proceed, and provide a guide
for the development of more extensive standards.246
b. Corruption Cases
Two other reported cases in which courts have applied due
process because of outrageous police conduct have involved
prosecutions of defendants for official corruption. In United
States v. Jannotti247-one of several cases resulting from an
undercover operation popularly denominated "Abscam"--the
trial judge set aside guilty verdicts on the grounds of entrap-
ment and due process. 248 In Jannotti, undercover FBI agents,
assisted by a career swindler named Weinberg,249 disguised
themselves as representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks who
wished to invest huge sums of money in Philadelphia. In vari-
ous meetings with the undercover investigators, Schwartz, the
President of the Philadelphia City Council, and Jannotti, a
member of the Council, assured them that they would solve
any problems that arose in connection with the sheik's propos-
als. In return, the agents insisted, over Schwartz's and Jan-
notti's protests, that they accept large sums of cash,
threatening to withdraw their offer if the city officials refused.
Thus, Schwartz received $30,000 and Jannotti received $10,000
cash, which, under the jury's findings, were bribes for guaran-
teeing the officials' support.
The court concluded that the defendants proved entrap-
ment as a matter of law, and that the government violated due
process. In its rebuttal of the entrapment defense, the govern-
ment's only proof of the defendants' predisposition was their
244. Id. at 381.
245. Id.
246. See notes 264-388 infra and accompanying text.
247. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (EMD. Pa. 1980), rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11,
1982).
248. Id. at 1205.
249. The court described Weinberg as the "archetypical amoral fast-buck
artist." Id. at 1193. He had agreed to cooperate with the government when
faced with a substantial prison sentence for an unrelated crime. Id.
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acceptance of the money.250 The court held that this proof was
insufficient. 251 First, the cash amounts were "exceedingly gen-
erous," constituting a "substantial temptation to a first offense."
Second, the agents did not ask or expect the defendants to do
anything improper on behalf of the hotel venture. Third, the
agents led the defendants to believe that, if they did not accept
the money, the project would not come to Philadelphia. In
short, "the governmental inducement ... was calculated to
overwhelm." 252
This "governmental overreaching" also violated due pro-
cess. Unlike the court in Isaacson, and to a lesser extent the
court in Twigg, the Jannotti court did not present a very de-
tailed explanation of the factors involved in its conclusions. In-
stead, it used more general criticisms, claiming that the
government's techniques went far beyond the necessities of le-
gitimate law enforcement. While the court conceded that it
would be permissible for government agents to set up an un-
dercover business entity, and to "hint" that corrupt overtures
"would be welcome," it was neither necessary nor appropriate
to add further incentives "virtually amounting to an appeal to
civic duty."253
The district court's ruling in Jannotti was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.2 m Recognizing the
jury's unusual opportunity to view the defendants' acts on
videotape, the court held that a reasonable jury could find pre-
disposition in the minds of Jannotti and Schwartz.255 The court
of appeals also overturned the due process ruling, but, as with
the lower court opinion, provided little explanation of the due
process criteria it employed. Distinguishing the Twigg case
where "the government initiated and was actively involved in
the operation of the criminal enterprise itself," the court rea-
250. Id. at 1200.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1204. As a further ground for invoking due process, the court, cit-
ig United States v. Archer, argued that "the federal courts should not sanction
the artificial federalization of purely state crimes." Id. Moreover, "it is surely
not within the legitimate province of federal agents to embark upon a program
of corrupting municipal officials, merely to demonstrate that it is possible." Id.
at 1205. In a subsequent case also ariing out of an "Abscam" prosecution, the
district court took an approach contrary to that in Jannotti. In United States v.
Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1247-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), the court denied defendants'
post trial motions to set aside their convictions on due process grounds.
254. United States v. Janotti, No. 81-1020, (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982), rev'g 501 F.
Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
255. Id.
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soned that the Abscam agents "merely created the fiction that
[they] sought to buy the commodity-influence-that the de-
fendants proclaimed they already possessed." This type of con-
duct did not constitute the necessary "outrageousness." 256
The only other recent decision barring prosecution on due
process grounds concerns, appropriately enough, the staged ar-
rest. In People v. Rao, discussed earlier,257 the New York Ap-
pellate Division condemned the prosecutor's use of the
simulated arrest to investigate corruption, but refused to dis-
miss perjury indictments arising from a related grand jury in-
quiry.25 8 After the case was sent back to the lower court, the
defendant was convicted of perjury. He then appealed his con-
viction to the same court that earlier had condemned the inves-
tigative procedure, yet had not held it violative of due process.
This time the court reversed the conviction, and apparently
overruled its prior decision, holding that the prosecutor had vi-
olated due process. The court predicated its decision on two
grounds: the manner in which the prosecutor obtained a per-
jury indictment in the grand jury and the manufacturing of a
fictitious crime.
The court concluded that in obtaining the perjury indict-
ments, the prosecutor had "befouled and besmirched" the crim-
inal justice system by violating the attorney-client relationship,
withholding exculpatory evidence from the grand jury, giving
"erroneous, coercive and misleading instructions" to control
the grand jury's determination, and asking numerous leading
questions. The prosecutor allegedly committed these "trans-
gressions" "to satiate his appetite for indictments."259
The staged arrest, the court's other due process ground,
provoked the court to even greater outrage. It characterized
the procedure as "vigilante justice,"260 demonstrating the pros-
ecutor's "undisguised contempt for the rule of law. '261 In its
moral indignation, however, the court ignored its apparently
controlling decision in Archer, in which the court upheld a
staged arrest despite a due process challenge.262 Since the
Archer case sustained virtually the same investigative tech-
256. Id.
257. See note 80 supra; notes 61-79 supra and accompanying text.
258. 73 A.D.2d 88, 90, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (1980). See text accompanying
note 66 supra.
259. 73 A.D.2d at 96-97, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 127-28.
260. Id. at 100, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
261. Id. at 96, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
262. See text accompanying notes 48-60 upra.
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nique found so offensive in Rao, however, the Rao court may
have been concentrating on the prosecutor's aggravated mis-
conduct before the grand jury, an occurence that was not pres-
ent in Archer.
More importantly, the Rao court ignored Archer's four cri-
teria for evaluating due process. 2 63 Instead, it employed the
vague standards of Russell and Rochin and reacted to the pros-
ecutor's actions because of a shocked judicial conscience.
Thus, courts in subsequent cases are left only with a condem-
nation of the particular practices in this situation, an inade-
quate guide for cases that do not conform to these facts.
V. THE RELEVANT CRITERIA IN A DUE PROCESS
ADJUDICATION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
THE STAGED ARREST
The preceding examination of the use of due process in un-
dercover investigations reveals that courts generally will not
hesitate to find a due process violation arising from a prosecu-
tor's undercover activities. Unfortunately, the examination also
reveals that most courts have adopted the substantive due pro-
cess test, which vaguely describes a violation as conduct that
individual judges find "outrageous." The Isaacson case, and to
a lesser extent the Twigg case, stand out as attempts to dis-
lodge the shocked judicial conscience test, and to establish in
its place meaningful objective criteria by which to measure the
lawfulness of police undercover tactics in general, and the
staged arrest in particular. Using these criteria as guides, it is
possible to formulate an objective due process analysis that
will effectively curb prosecutorial bad faith, abuse, and excess
in the undercover investigation of crime.
This Article will divide its proposed due process criteria
into two groups that represent two levels of analysis-one fo-
cusing on ends, and the other focusing on means. The first
level seeks to determine whether the government's ends are le-
gitimate, that is, whether the government has a permissible
and substantial law enforcement objective for its undercover
investigation. The two factors contained in this group are the
factual justification for the operation and the government's
good faith. If these first-level factors reveal that the govern-
ment's ends are legitimate, the court must then consider the
second level. This level seeks to determine whether the gov-
263. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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ernment's means were legitimate, that is, whether its under-
cover investigative techniques were necessary and proper. The
six factors contained in this group are the necessity of the oper-
ation, the government's participation in the criminal activity,
the nature of the government's solicitation, the social harm the
undercover techniques might cause, the violation of individual
rights, and the government's effort to minimize harmful
consequences.
A. THE LEGITIMACY OF ENDS
1. Factual Justification
Due process protects citizens against arbitrary government
action. The government's arbitrary subjection of individuals to
solicitation or surveillance, and its capricious temptation of
persons to commit crimes for no other purpose than to obtain
convictions, is the very sort of abuse that the due process
clause is designed to curb. The court in United States v.
Twigg264 felt that the dangers arising from the lack of a factual
justification created a due process violation.265 Absent a factual
predicate, government interference by undercover methods
leads directly to a police state.266
To illustrate the dangers of allowing the government to pro-
ceed without a factual justification, consider the results of let-
ting the government act on the basis of each of three different
levels of factual support. If the government bases its under-
264. For a discussion of Twigg, see text accompanying notes 234-43 supra.
265. 588 F.2d 373, 381 (3d Cir. 1973). The court found it "baffling" that the
government made an arrangement to deal with a serious felon who may have
run from 50 to 100 narcotics laboratories "in exchange for the convictions of two
men with no apparent criminal designs, and without the expertise required to
set up a single laboratory." Id. at 381 n.9. One student commentary suggests
that the basis for the holding in Tvigg was the government's lack of any factual
predicate to investigate the defendants. See Note, Due Process Defense When
Government Agents Instigate and Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L.J. 1455 (1979).
266. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), where Justice
Brandeis said in dissent-
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. . . . They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the [Constitution].
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 265, at
1471; Note, supra note 83, at 951; Comment, The Defense of Entrapment. A Plea
for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63, 80-81 (1967).
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cover investigation on facts indicating present criminal activity,
or suggesting that a particular individual is about to commit a
crime,267 the government is not overreaching in affirmatively
soliciting particular groups or individuals; there is no danger of
arbitrary prosecution. If the government bases its investigation
on facts that indicate that official corruption exists, but that fail
to identify particular individuals, the government does not vio-
late due process as long as it does not actively target any par-
ticular person. By providing a simulated opportunity for any
potential offender to engage in the crime, or even by going fur-
ther and "spreading the word" about the opportunity, as the
agent did in United States v. Jannotti,268 the government does
not actively interfere with a person's capacity to make an in-
dependent decision.
But if the government has no factual basis for its investiga-
tion, the government violates due process if it approaches indi-
viduals at random. The government would then be using
intrusive and deceptive undercover weaponry to test the integ-
rity or criminal propensities of citizens at large. This is deeply
disturbing for several reasons. First, it constitutes a serious in-
vasion into a person's privacy, and, once allowed, has bound-
less potential as a tool of oppression and intimidation. In
addition, subjecting citizens indiscriminately to a test of their
integrity neither prevents crime nor aids in the detection of
crime as much as it seduces into crime persons who are pliant
and easily tempted.269 Finally, undercover integrity tests are
inefficient; they consume scarce resources whose more proper
use lies in tracking down law breakers. Thus, law enforcement
agencies should justify themselves not by the treacherous,
bootstrapping practice of randomly approaching people, hoping
that they will succumb to crime, but by the more painstaking
effort to apprehend criminals.
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate the re-
quirement of factual justification, depending on the extent of
its factual predicate. The government may possess specific in-
formation that particular individuals are involved in corrupt ac-
tivities, as in the first hypothetical situation, and not violate
due process even if it deliberately solicits those individuals.270
267. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
268. No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982); see notes 247-256 supra and accompa-
nying text.
269. See notes 275-86 infra and accompanying text.
270. This was the situation in both the Archer and Nigrone cases. In
Archer, "federal prosecutors had been given abundant information about the
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Or the government may possess information that supports a
general suspicion of corruption, and not violate due process if it
does not actively target particular people.271 If there is no in-
formation of corruption, and the operation is used merely to
test the integrity of random members of the court system, the
staged arrest violates due process standards regardless of the
degree to which it solicits particular individuals.72
2. The Government's Good Faith
This second criterion evaluates whether the government
used the undercover investigative procedure in good faith, or
more precisely, whether the government's assumed purpose in
using the procedure is to investigate ongoing or anticipated
crime to gather evidence of such wrongdoing or is, instead, to
create a new crime simply for the sake of punishing the wrong-
doer. Both Isaacson2 73 and Twigg 274 used this criterion in find-
ing a violation of due process. The question in analyzing the
government's good faith is whether the investigative conduct
demonstrates specific substantive law enforcement goals, such
as the interdiction of the supply and distribution of narcotics,
widespread fixing of cases in the Queens Country District Attorney's office."
486 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1973). In Nigrone, the court noted the existence of "al-
legedly specific information about corruption." 46 A.D.2d 343, 344, 362 N.Y.S.2d
513, 514 (1974).
271. This general suspicion can be based, for example, on suspicious rela-
tionships between judges and attorneys, or on suspicious patterns of results in
particular cases.
272. The Office of the Attorney General of the United States recently issued
"guidelines" to federal investigative agencies engaged in criminal investiga-
tions and undercover operations. The guidelines limit undercover operations of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation by prohibiting the agents, unless the Direc-
tor of the Bureau otherwise approves, from offering inducements to individuals
to engage in illegal activity unless 'there is a reasonable indication, based on
information developed through informants or other means, that the subject is
engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage in illegal activity of a similar
type." See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL, ATrOR-
NEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 14 (1981) (herein-
after cited as GUIDELINES ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS).
With respect to criminal investigations generally, the guidelines note that
"individuals and organizations should be free from law enforcement scrutiny
that is undertaken without a valid factual predicate and without a valid law en-
forcement purpose." To this end, the guidelines authorize the opening of an in-
vestigation only when there are facts or circumstances that "'reasonably
indicate"' a federal criminal violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.
See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE Arron-
NEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 3 (1980) (hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES ON CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS).
273. See text accompanying note 233 supra.
274. See text accompanying notes 244-45 supra.
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or the gathering of evidence against a police official suspected
of corruption. If the prosecution can identify such concrete
goals, it would tend to negate bad faith. Absent such a concrete
showing, a court should deem the procedure suspect.
Of all the relevant due process criteria, illicit government
motivation is the most subjective. Any inquiry into motive re-
quires extremely difficult value judgments, and very delicate
assessments of official acts. This difficulty is demonstrated in
the district court's decision in United States v. Jannotti.2 75
There the court found that the government's motivation was
improper.276 The court agreed, however, that the undercover
procedure was necessary, and the initiation of bribe overtures
appropriate.277 The court also noted its "distress and disgust at
the crass behavior" of the corrupt defendants revealed by the
recorded and videotaped evidence.278 How, then, could the
court conclude that the government's motivation was im-
proper? Presumably, the governmental inducement was so
overwhelming that it constituted an inordinate temptation for
the defendants to become corrupt. And this inducement, the
court believed, revealed the government's true purpose: to
prove "not that the defendants were corrupt city officials, but
that, exposed to strong temptation, they could be rendered cor-
rupt."279 No objective support for this conclusion existed; it
was a subjective evaluation based on circumstantial evidence.
Although cases like Jannotti, in which the government's
motivation is not readily apparent, do occur, there are many
other cases in which the government's bad or good faith is
clearer. For example, if the government bargains with a seri-
ous chronic offender to elicit his cooperation against persons
not presently engaged in crime,280 or becomes both the defend-
ant's supplier and purchaser of contraband, and refrains from
investigating other potential sources of the defendant's sup-
ply,281 the defendant has a compelling argument that the gov-
ernment's true purpose is to create new crime, not to pursue
legitimate law enforcement goals. On the other hand, if the
275. See text accompanying notes 247-53 supra.
276. 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980). See text accompanying note 279
infra.
277. 501 F. Supp. at 1204.
278. Id. at 1205.
279. Id. at 1200.
280. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Isaac-
son, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
281. United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
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government carefully infiltrates an ongoing crime,282 feigns in-
terest in the defendant's criminal overtures to gain the defend-
ant's confidence,2 83 or sets up a controlled operation that it
believes will attract already existing criminals,2 84 the govern-
ment's motive is clearly legitimate. It seeks to promote central
law enforcement objectives: the prevention, detection, and
prosecution of crime.
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate this cri-
terion also, depending on the government's motivation in using
it. A court would have to evaluate all of the circumstances
before making such a determination. In the Archer285 and
Nigrone286 cases, interestingly, the courts did not dispute the
prosecutors' good faith. In People v. Rao, however, the appel-
late court denounced the prosecutor for contriving to "set up"
the defendant for a perjury charge before the grand jury.287 In
making this determination, courts should be aware of its sub-
jective aspects, and require that concrete goals of law enforce-
ment be identified before concluding that the government acted
in good faith.
B. THE LEGITIMACY OF MEANS
1. Necessity for the Operation
Even if the government's ends are legitimate, one must still
justify the particular means that the government uses to
achieve those ends. One factor in determining whether the
government's investigative techniques violate due process is
the necessity for using the undercover operation. If the investi-
gative procedure is not necessary to achieve legitimate law en-
forcement goals, its use may not be a proper exercise of
government power, particularly if the deceptive techniques in-
vade the privacy of the individual under investigation. In mak-
ing such a determination, two questions are relevant: does the
crime under investigation reasonably require use of undercover
techniques or are less offensive alternative techniques avail-
able; and is the investigative technique reasonably related to
the investigative goals?
One must first ask whether the undercover investigation is
282. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
283. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
284. United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
285. 486 F.2d 670, 683 (2d Cir. 1973).
286. 46 A.D.2d 343, 348, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1974).
287. 73 A.D.2d 88, 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (1980). See generally Gershman,
supra note 72.
[Vol. 66:567
STAGED ARRESTS
necessary or whether the government can obtain evidence of
wrongdoing without infiltration or deceit. Certain crimes are
readily discoverable with the use of less intrusive measures.
Crimes of violence, for example, such as assault, robbery, bur-
glary or rape, ordinarily are provable by testimonial evidence
from complaining victims and eyewitnesses, as well as by tan-
gible evidence, such as the proceeds of the crime or the instru-
mentalities used in its commission. On the other hand, crimes
conducted clandestinely and without complaining victims, nar-
cotics crimes for example,28 8 frequently require investigators to
use undercover techniques. If reasonable and less excessive
nonundercover alternatives exist, however, courts may view
the use of undercover techniques as an unnecessary abuse of
power if they intrude into the private domain of the individ-
ual.28 9 The "least drastic alternative" test currently restricts
other highly intrusive investigative procedures. In applying for
an eavesdropping warrant to intercept verbal communications
electronically, for example, a government official must certify
that other investigative procedures have been tried and failed,
appear unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous.2 90 A
similar consideration should apply in evaluating, under due
process, the overall fairness of undercover techniques that also
intrude heavily into people's lives.
Assuming that undercover infiltration is necessary, one
must then ask whether the particular undercover technique is
reasonably related to the investigative goals. A particular un-
dercover technique is not reasonably related if less extreme
undercover techniques would be as effective in curbing the
crime. In United States v. Russell 2 91 and Hampton v. United
288. See note 13 supra and accompanying text, United States v. Rosner, 485
F.2d 1213, 1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
289. The Supreme Court has implicitly included consideration of the avail-
able investigative alternatives in approving various undercover methods to ex-
pose narcotic crimes. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the Court
stated. 'Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned
to one of the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings
and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices." Id. at 432.
Moreover, "there are circumstances when the use of deceit is the only practica-
ble law enforcement technique available." Id. at 436. Similarly, in Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), Justice Powell noted in his concurring opin-
ion: "One cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law enforce-
ment authorities in dealing effectively with an expanding narcotics traffic ....
Enforcement officials therefore must be allowed flexibility adequate to counter
effectively such criminal activity." Id. at 495-96 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
290. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (c) (1976). See also C. FIsHMAN, WIRETAPPING
AND EAVESDROPPING 118-28 (1978).
291. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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States, 92 the Supreme Court approved fairly extreme under-
cover methods as reasonably suited to the investigative objec-
tive, interdicting the manufacture and distribution of narcotics.
In United States v. Twigg, however, although not disputing the
necessity of an undercover operation, the court of appeals
sharply distinguished between the sale of illegal drugs, which
"may require more extreme methods of investigation,"293 and a
drug distribution conspiracy which is not as "fleeting and elu-
sive [a] crime to detect," and presumably requires less ex-
treme undercover methods. 94 Similarly, the district court in
United States v. Jannotti condoned the undercover technique
used to expose municipal corruption-the establishment of
fictitious business entities and the initiation of bribes295--but
condemned the excessive nature of the bribe offers. 296 In other
words, although the undercover procedure was proper in the
abstract, its implementation was so extreme that it violated due
process.
An investigation using a staged arrest satisfies this crite-
rion because it is the only viable method of detecting judicial
corruption. None of the appellate courts reviewing the propri-
ety of the staged arrest, however, examined whether the proce-
dure was necessary.297 This is surprising in view of the
apparent necessity for the staged arrest. First, undercover
techniques are necessary in uncovering and gathering evidence
of corruption within the judicial system because no less offen-
sive alternatives are available.298 Like narcotics violations, con-
292. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
293. 588 F.2d 373, 378 (3d Cir. 1978).
294. Id.
295. 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
296. Id.
297. The lower court in People v. Archer, however, did characterize the
staged arrest as virtually "indispensable" to flushing out corruption in the judi-
cial system. 177 N.YJ-J., March 10, 1977, at 13 (Queens County N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
The District Attorney of Kings County, whose grand jury was utilized to obtain
the indictment in the fictitious case, stated in an affirmation that the staged ar-
rest was "faithfully utilized... to promote the fair and legitimate interests of
law enforcement." Record on Appeal at 206, In re Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d
421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
The New York State Bar Association formally requested permission to fie
a memorandum amicus curiae in the Court of Appeals in Nigrone v. Murtagh,
46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974), endorsing the concept of staged arrest.
The court denied the request on March 17, 1975.
298. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. DiSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 282 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971); PRESmnENrr's COMMISSION ON LAw EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIE IN A
FREE SOCIETY 198-99 (1967); Gershman, supra note 72, at 628 n.1l.
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spiracies to "fix" criminal cases, for example, produce no
complaining victims. Moreover, official corruption does not pro-
duce tangible evidence. Crimes such as bribery provide no tan-
gible proof of past or present criminality, such as
instrumentalities, contraband, or other visible evidence. The
evidence of a corrupt judicial deal consists of an unheard con-
versation, an unseen benefit, or a corrupt dismissal which offi-
cial court records could not prove.299 Questioning witnesses,
the one possible nonundercover technique that could reveal in-
formation, would expose the investigation and alert the targets,
who might then destroy the little available evidence, or collec-
tively tailor their stories.
Second, the staged arrest is reasonably related to the in-
vestigative goals; less extreme undercover methods will not be
effective. Just as the undercover agent needs to establish "le-
gitimacy" to gain the confidence of a narcotics ring, so does an
undercover agent investigating the court system need to estab-
lish his or her credentials. The only practical means to estab-
lish these credentials is to pose as a real defendant seeking to
purchase justice. Other investigative techniques, such as elec-
tronic eavesdropping 30 or visual surveillance, although of pos-
sible use later in the investigation, cannot provide the initial
base for launching the investigation.
2. Government's Participation in Criminal Activity
In infiltrating and gathering evidence of a criminal conspir-
acy, or in providing a simulated opportunity for defendants to
engage in crime, government agents often commit acts that
would be subject to penal sanction if committed by private per-
sons. An important criterion of due process is, therefore, the
degree of governmental criminal activity that is permissible.
One can divide the criminal activity that undercover tech-
niques generate into two broad categories. The first category
encompasses situations in which the government involves itself
directly in the criminal operation under investigation. Typi-
299. The court records would only reveal that the court arrived at the result
asserted by the prosecutor, which is of limited probative value.
300. Investigators probably could not use electronic eavesdropping, even if
theoretically effective, if the information supporting the required warrant re-
lated to conduct that occurred in the past. See C. FisimAN, supra note 290, at
108-10. Whether information is too stale would depend on the facts of the case.
Where the facts demonstrate a continuing course of criminal conduct, the pas-
sage of time becomes less critical. See United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285,
287 (10th Cir. 1972).
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cally, the agents must engage in some form of contractual
transaction-purchase or sale-to prosecute the wrongdoer. In
most contraband cases, for example, undercover agents must
purchase drugs, infiltrate a drug conspiracy, or involve them-
selves in the manufacture or distribution process of an existing
criminal ring. Or, in investigating a political machine, govern-
ment agents might pose as corrupt persons and offer bribes.
Although these acts technically could be considered crimes,
courts conclude that they are not, either upon a law enforce-
ment justification theory,301 or upon the theory that no crime
has been committed because the agents lack felonious
intent.302
This category of criminal activity is a recognized considera-
tion under due process. 30 3 Excessive government involvement
in the crime not only perverts the ends of law enforcement, as
Justice Brandeis understood in his Olmstead dissent,304 it also
may unfairly punish persons only peripherally involved in the
crime,305 persons lured back into criminal behavior who had
tried to reform,306 or persons easily susceptible to tempta-
tion.307 The difficulty lies in determining the degree to which
government involvement becomes so excessive that it violates
due process. On the one hand, courts have held that govern-
ment infiltration of a criminal operation, the temporary supply
of essential items for its continued success, and the assumption
of a major role in the operation's ongoing affairs do not consti-
tute undue involvement.308 On the other hand, the courts
would hardly permit government agents to instigate muggings
merely to convict members of a gang of hoodlums.309 Between
these two extremes lies a broad spectrum of hypothetical cases
in which it is not clear if due process is violated. One can iden-
301. See note 57 supra.
302. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1223 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974). But see United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29,
35 (D.D.C. 1974), affd, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120
(1977) (defendant was convicted of violating a citizen's fourth amendment
rights).
303. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1957); Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
304. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
305. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
306. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
307. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
308. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); United States v. Gonzalez,
539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.
1976).
309. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973), quoted in
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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tify, however, several considerations that might be helpful in
making that determination: whether the government's involve-
ment was of long duration; whether the government's involve-
ment was direct and continuous; and whether the government's
involvement was necessary for the continued success of the
operation.310
One consideration is worth separate emphasis: whether
the government instigated and created the criminal operation.
If the government actually initiates the crime as in Twigg,3 11
Jannotti,31 2 and Isaacson,313 the question of the nature, extent,
and duration of the government's involvement under a due pro-
cess standard takes on critical significance. If the government's
role is dominant and substantial, the court may view the gov-
ernment as the actual perpetrator of the crime.314 This argu-
ment is even stronger if, as in Twigg, the defendant lacks the
310. In one extreme case involving violations of liquor regulations, Greene
v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit condemned as
"wholly impermissible" the participation of a government agent in establishing
and sustaining a criminal operation for several years. An agent contacted two
defendants with whom he had previously been involved in the production of
bootleg alcohol and pressured them to re-establish operations. The agent's in-
volvement was substantial: he offered to provide a still, a still site, still equip-
ment, and an operator. He actually provided two thousand pounds of sugar at
wholesale. The illicit operation lasted for three and one-half years. During this
period, the government agent was the only customer, and he paid for the liquor
with government funds. The court found entrapment inapplicable since the de-
fendants had the predisposition to sell bootleg whiskey. The court reversed
nonetheless, saying "[w]hen the Government permits itself to become en-
meshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent which appears
here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment repugnant to
American criminal justice are operative." Id. at 787.
311. See text accompanying notes 236-37 supra.
312. See text accompanying note 249 supra.
313. See text accompanying note 225 supra.
314. In Twgg, Jannotti, and Isaacson, the courts found the government's
activities excessive enough to violate due process. By contrast, courts have
been more reluctant to find a due process violation if the investigation infil-
trates an ongoing crime. In several cases in which the government's involve-
ment in the operation was substantial, the courts emphasized that the
government penetrated an ongoing operation and assumed a role that the de-
fendants expected it to play. Thus, where the government infiltrated a counter-
feiting scheme and did the actual printing, the court found that since the
defendant initiated the crime and directed the operation, the defendant could
not rely on due process. United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir.
1976). Similarly, courts have sustained several other cases of arguably exces-
sive government involvement largely because the defendants were predis-
posed, and because the government infiltrated an ongoing crime and merely
"facilitated" its operation. See, e.g., United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975 (1979); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Gonzalez, 539 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
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expertise, ability, or inclination to begin to carry out the crime
without government assistance.315 But even if the government
merely infiltrates an ongoing crime, there must be a point at
which its involvement becomes intolerable. It is disturbing to
see government officials thoroughly and continuously involved
in criminal operations, even if they are acting to gather evi-
dence of criminality. A difficult balance is required. But in a
close case, the wise judge may well conclude that it is "a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the Govern-
ment should play an ignoble part."3 16
The second broad category of governmental criminal activ-
ity encompasses those situations in which the investigators are
not directly involved in the crimes they are investigating. This
category includes two subsections. One subsection includes
those crimes committed by the government agent that are nec-
essary to make the eventual criminal operation successful. In
one case, for example,317 an undercover agent entered an estab-
lishment suspected of gambling violations. To establish the le-
gitimacy of his disguised role, he placed bets himself and was
arrested. The conviction was reversed on the ground that the
defendant lacked criminal intent. The other subsection in-
cludes those crimes that are only marginally related to the
criminal investigation, and independent of any crimes commit-
ted by the defendant.18 In one narcotics case, for example, the
defendant argued that the government's payment of the in-
formant's living expenses violated the state's prostitution
laws.319
Courts generally condone the government's involvement in
crimes included in the first subsection. As long as the crimes
are reasonably necessary to carry out the investigation, the
courts realize that these acts are justifiable and do not violate
due process. 20 Crimes included in the second subsection, how-
315. 588 F.2d 373, 381 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978).
316. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
317. State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); United
States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Owens,
228 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1964).
319. United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Van Maanen, 547 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Gonzalez, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531 (9th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
[Vol. 66:567
STAGED ARRESTS
ever, have come under greater criticism since the government
need not have committed the crime to gather its evidence
against the defendant. Just as the government may not exces-
sively enmesh itself in the criminal activity under investigation,
so too must it refrain from unnecessary illegal activity. Al-
though some courts have found such conduct irrelevant for due
process purposes, 321 others have found such conduct
intolerable.322
An investigation using a staged arrest meets this criterion.
Although the government will likely commit crimes in both
broad categories, it does not violate due process in doing so. Its
agents commit a crime in the first category in dealing with judi-
cial officials to arrange a 'Tix" in the manufactured case, thus
participating in the crime under investigation. As noted above,
participation in this type of crime can violate due process if the
government's involvement becomes too excessive. 23 Yet
staged arrests have not generally involved the agent-defendant
in a significant role.3 24 Although the government manufactures
the crime, its subsequent involvement is insubstantial and thus
not objectionable. Moreover, in the aftermath of Russell and
Hampton, the courts have been cautious in condemning as
overinvolvement questionable undercover practices.325 This re-
luctance, combined with the relatively limited governmental
participation in the crime under investigation, renders this
criminal behavior immune from a due process attack.
The government's agents also are likely to commit crimes
in the second category, crimes that are not the crimes being in-
vestigated-in this instance acts of official corruption. In manu-
facturing the staged arrest they may violate state law, for
example, by filing false documents and false statements before
U.S. 931 (1974); State v. Dingman, 232 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1950); People v. Joyce, 47
A.D.2d 562, 363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975); People v. Mills, 91 A.D. 331, 86 N.Y.S. 529,
affd, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904); State v. Busscher, 81 Nev. 587, 407 P.2d 715
(1965).
321. United States v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443 (10tlA Cir. 1978); United States v.
Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
322. United States v. Quatermain, 467 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United
States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1964).
323. See text accompanying notes 308-16 supra.
324. In United States v. Archer, the three codefendants fabricated the
agent's story and supervised its presentation to the jury. See text accompany-
ing notes 27-33 supra. In Nigrone v. Murtagh, the agent's attorney prepared the
agent's phony story and made all the arrangements for the fix. See text accom-
panying notes 63-65 supra.
325. See Park, supra note 83, at 189.
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judges and juries. 32 6 Although some courts have harshly con-
demned these actions, 327 other courts have noted that the com-
mission of these technical crimes was justified as a reasonable
exercise of the police power, and did not violate concepts of
fairness.3 28 The latter position is more reasonable, since these
crimes are not crimes independent of and unrelated to the de-
fendant's illegal activities. They are necessary to make the
eventual criminal operation successful. Moreover, although a
court may castigate a prosecutor for lying to judges and grand
jurors,3 2 9 the immorality of lying may be outweighed by the
morality of exposing corruption in the judicial system.33 0 Thus,
even though the government commits crimes in a staged arrest
proceeding, the crimes are not excessive, nor are they unjusti-
fied. As a result, a staged arrest meets this criterion of due
process.
3. Nature of the Solicitation
Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[h] uman nature is
weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without gov-
ernment adding to them and generating crime."331 As the
Isaacson case demonstrates, government inducements can
sometimes be offensive enough to violate due process. 33 2 Over-
zealous solicitations reveal law enforcement officers aggres-
sively bent on pressuring citizens to commit a crime for law
enforcement's sake, rather than as an incident to detecting and
preventing ongoing crime. And the greater the government's
pressure, the greater the possibility of luring into crime inno-
cent persons not disposed to breaking the law.
Solicitations vary considerably, as do the personalities of
the people subject to their temptation. The predisposition test
of entrapment 33 often glosses over the varieties of induce-
326. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
327. See text accompanying notes 36-37, 66-68 supra.
328. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
329. See text accompanying notes 36-37, 66-68 supra.
330. The subject of the morality of lying has generated an ongoing debate
among philosophers. One school holds that lying is absolutely immoral, regard-
less of the consequences. See L KANT, THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHIcs 267 (1836).
Opposed to this is the view that some lying is morally permissible where it has
socially desirable consequences. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 69-78 (1978);
S. PUFENDORF, IV LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS IN EIGHT BooKs ch. 1, subch. 16
(B. Kenneth trans. 1729). See generally S. Boy, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUB-
uIc AND PrVATE LIFE (1978).
331. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
332. See text accompanying notes 207, 228-33 supra.
333. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
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ments and dimensions of character, simplistically inquiring
whether the defendant demonstrated a readiness and willing-
ness to engage in crime. Under a due process test, however,.
one ought to analyze the nature and extent of the inducement
and the character of the person solicited, not to determine the
defendant's inclination to crime but, rather, to determine the
government's sense of fair play. Inducements might consist of,
for example, simple requests,334 repeated and persistent re-
quests, 335 physical threats, 336 promises of romantic involve-
ment,3 37 promises of exorbitant gain,3 38 or appeals to
sickness, 339 sympathy,340 friendship, or pride.34 ' Persons sub-
ject to the solicitations might include, for example, chronic of-
fenders requiring very little inducement,342 prior offenders who
may have decided to reform but are very susceptible to pres-
sure,343 prior offenders who need more persuasion to return to
crime,344 innocent people who are weak and vulnerable to
temptation,3 4 5 or innocent people who resolutely obey the law
but might succumb to attractive inducements. 346 Due process
should limit those solicitations that are excessive in light of the
type of individual they are directed toward, even though under
the entrapment doctrine one could probably show
predisposition.3 47
Several courts have essentially used this criterion, holding
that the government's solicitations were too extreme. In United
States v. Jannotti, for instance, the district court found that the
334. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
335. See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1978).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1977).
337. See, e.g., United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1981).
338. See, e.g., United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
339. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
340. See, e.g., Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1966).
341. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 430 (1932).
342. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1967).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
344. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
345. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1977).
346. See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1982).
347. The courts generally do not inquire into the subjective state of mind of
the defendant in evaluating the defendant's predisposition. Rather, the inquiry
usually relates to the promptness or willingness of the defendant to engage in
the criminal activity. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. Thus, a de-
fendant's weak will may likely cause the court to find predisposition, although
the same weakness may be a significant factor in finding that the government's
solicitation was excessive.
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nature and extent of the solicitations were so excessive that it
violated principles of fairness under due process. -3 The bribes
were very large, the defendants were not requested to do any-
thing improper, and the defendants were led to believe that if
they did not accept the money, the project would not come to
their city.349 Similarly, in People v. Isaacson, the court found
that the solicitations were excessive, unfair, and explicitly a
ground for reversal under due process.350 The informant made
repeated telephone calls to the defendant, recalling their
friendship and sobbing that he faced life imprisonment, that
his parents and friends had abandoned him, and that he
needed money to hire a lawyer and raise bail.35 '
One should, however, view the nature of the solicitation
and the other due process factors, just as the court did in Isaac-
son, in conjunction with other aspects of the undercover opera-
tion.352 Some solicitations by themselves might be egregious
enough to violate due process. 353 With others, it would be nec-
essary to inquire into the nature of the transaction, the defend-
ant's state of mind, and the government's conduct apart from
the solicitation.
An investigation using a staged arrest may be unduly intru-
sive and, therefore, violate this criterion. Excessive and im-
proper solicitations may occur in the course of the investigation
after the initial crime has been contrived and sent into the jus-
tice system. The government agents might be excessive in
their entreaties of defense attorneys or others to help the
agents escape the prosecutor's charges. As is the case under
an objective entrapment test, such solicitations would be sub-
ject to scrutiny under due process because of their capacity, as
in Jannotti,354 to tempt into crime persons who otherwise
would not likely break the law.
4. Societal Harm
Another important criterion under due process is whether
348. 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, No. 81-1020 (3d Cir. Feb. 11,
1982). See text accompanying notes 247-56 supra.
349. See text accompanying note 252 supra.
350. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978). See text accompa-
nying notes 227-32 supra.
351. See 44 N.Y.2d at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
352. See text accompanying notes 225-30 supra.
353. Arguably this was the case in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958), in which the Court found entrapment as a matter of law. The Court. was
not presented with a due process argument and did not discuss the issue.
354. See text accompanying notes 250-52 supra.
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the undercover activity produced concrete social harm. Under-
cover conduct that causes or threatens harm to innocent per-
sons or institutions is totally alien to proper police functions.
Paraphrasing Judge Friendly's pronouncement in United States
v. Archer, it would be unthinkable for government agents to in-
filtrate a gang of juveniles and perpetrate rapes to gather evi-
dence for prosecution.355 Such conduct not only constitutes an
intolerable participation in crime, but also involves unneces-
sary and gratuitous harm to society. There is absolutely no law
enforcement justification for such conduct, and government
techniques that cause or threaten such harm implicate due
process.
With few exceptions, courts have failed to notice or to eval-
uate the social harm that undercover investigations cause. In
United States v. Russell, a government agent supplied a drug
manufacturing ring with an essential ingredient for producing
drugs.356 The government permitted the ring to manufacture
and distribute the drugs into society for over a month before
making arrests. 357 This use of government power to aid and
abet the dissemination of drugs that could have resulted in se-
rious injury to citizens was improper. By contrast, if the under-
cover agents purchase contraband, but do not sell it, they
obviate the possibility of harm to society.358 Also, no harm
would result if, in a case like Russell, the government agent
purchased or recovered the manufactured drugs so that they
could not reach channels of commerce.359
Other cases have involved real and tangible social harm
that the courts did not adequately address. In one case, for ex-
ample, a government agent joined a burglary ring, stood by as a
burglary proceeded in his presence, and then helped to dispose
of the proceeds.360 In another case, government agents, in vio-
lation of state game laws, killed animals in concert with the de-
fendants.361 In yet another case, government agents sat by
355. 486 F.2d 670, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
356. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
357. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
358. Thus, a case such as Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976),
causes less societal harm than Russell, even though the government's conduct
may be subject to criticism for other reasons. See text accompanying notes 125-
26 supra.
359. See United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (government
agents handed over illicitly manufactured drugs to federal drug enforcement
agency on pretext of placing drugs in safety deposit box).
360. People v. Joyce, 47 A.D.2d 562, 363 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1975).
361. United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976).
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while people extorted money to induce official action, knowing
that those officials would retain the money for their own use.362
These cases do not cause the level of harm that government
brutality or threats of physical violence to innocent persons
cause; however, they isolate another factor pertinent to due
process.
Although an investigation using a staged arrest may cause
some societal harm, the degree of this harm is small enough
not to invalidate the investigation on due process grounds.
Certainly there is no tangible harm to society; narcotics are not
being disseminated, nor are lives or property being injured.
The staged arrest might, however, affect the public's confidence
in the impartiality of its judicial institutions. In addition, by in-
jecting a sham case into the court system, falsifying court pa-
pers, and lying to judges and grand jurors, the government
investigators threaten the integrity of these institutions by
making them unwitting accomplices in the investigation, and
by demonstrating contempt for procedures and safeguards cre-
ated for the legitimate resolution of disputes. Yet it is common
knowledge that prosecutors often use the court system's rules
and procedures, particularly the grand jury, to further the in-
terests of law enforcement, even though this decreases the
public's confidence in the courts' impartiality.3 63 Moreover, if
those same institutions are tainted with corruption, and justice
is a purchasable commodity, then it is likely that the public al-
ready holds the legal system in contempt and would welcome
the staged arrest as a needed antidote.
The use of fictitious court proceedings and the grand jury
to establish the credentials of undercover agents in preparation
for the exposure of corruption does not, therefore, appear in-
herently evil or improper. The staged arrest undoubtedly af-
fects the publicly perceived integrity or impartiality of the
system to some extent. But one must balance this nebulous
harm against the benefits derived from eradicating misconduct
from that system. This admittedly is difficult to resolve objec-
tively. On balance, however, this relatively small harm should
not alone violate due process.364
362. United States v. DiSapio, 435 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402
U.S. 999 (1971).
363. See note 72 supra.
364. Of course, this societal harm could combine with other adverse factors,
causing a staged arrest to violate due process. This possibility is a strong rea-
son to adopt the preventative due process safeguards discussed below. See
notes 389-412 infra and accompanying text.
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5. Violation of Individual Rights
Undercover police practices that deliberately violate an in-
dividual's rights inescapably implicate due process. 365 Al-
though government officials involved in an undercover
investigation might be justified in engaging in technically crimi-
nal conduct to establish their credentials and to further their
investigative role,3 66 there can be no justification for the know-
ing and deliberate violation of the rights of individuals.
It is clear that the government's infringement of the pro-
tected rights of the defendant automatically invokes due pro-
cess limitations.367 One court, for example, held that the
government violated a defendant's rights, and thus violated due
process, by abducting and torturing him.368 Similarly, a court
concluded that due process and other constitutional protections
applied when the government forcibly invaded the suspect's
body.3 69 A difficult question arises, however, if the undercover
activity invades the rights of a third party, not the rights of the
defendant. Ordinarily, rights are personal, and only the person
aggrieved may claim a violation of those rights.370 The govern-
ment's violation of the rights of a third party, however, ought to
be a relevant consideration in assessing, under due process, the
overall fairness of the investigative conduct.
The New York Court of Appeals adopted this approach in
People v. Isaaeson.3 7 ' The defendant in Isaacson did not con-
tend that the government infringed his personal rights. The
proof showed, however, that to elicit the cooperation of the
third party informant, the police beat, kicked, and threatened
to shoot him. The police also cruelly deceived him by apprising
him, falsely, that he faced a long prison term.37 2 The court
found this treatment repugnant enough to be a principal factor
in its decision to reverse the defendant's conviction on state
due process grounds. Although the defendant's rights were not
violated, the court believed that countenancing such conduct
365. See text accompanying notes 178-200 supra.
366. See text accompanying notes 357-364 supra.
367. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) ("Me limitations of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the
Government activity in question violates some protected right of the defend-
ant.") (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
368. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
369. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1957).
370. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
371. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
372. Id. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
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would condone police brutality and suggest that the end justi-
fies the means. 373
The Isaacson court's approach contrasts with the Supreme
Court's approach in United States v. Payner.374 In Payner, an
investigation by the Internal Revenue Service focused on a par-
ticular bank. Learning that an executive of this bank, an inno-
cent third party, carried important documents in his briefcase,
government agents devised an illegal scheme in which they en-
tered the bank executive's private room, seized the briefcase,
searched it, and copied several hundred documents. One of the
copied documents was critical in the prosecution of the defend-
ant for falsifying his income tax return. The federal district
court suppressed the seized evidence under its supervisory
powers, but also found that the government violated due pro-
cess, concluding that the government "knowingly and purpose-
fully obtained the briefcase materials with bad faith hostility
toward the strictures imposed on their activities by the
Constitution."37 -
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the two grounds for
the district court's decision. It concluded that the supervisory
power concept did "not authorize a federal court to suppress
otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized
unlawfully from a third party not before the court."37 6 More
importantly, although the Court did not dispute that the unlaw-
ful briefcase search may have violated fundamental fairness if
conducted against the defendant, 77 the Court found due pro-
cess did not protect the third party because "the limitations of
the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of
the defendant."37 8
373. Id. at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
374. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
375. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 130 (E.D. Ohio) (emphasis in
original), affd per curiam, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
The court explicitly found that the government affirmatively counseled its
agents that the fourth amendment standing limitation permitted them to delib-
erately conduct an unconstitutional search against persons to secure evidence
against the real targets of the investigation. 434 F. Supp. at 132-33.
376. 447 U.S. at 735. In light of United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973),
and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), it does not appear that the
supervisory power concept is distinct from due process, at least in terms of un-
dercover investigative conduct. For cases discussing the supervisory power
concept, see Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
377. 447 U.S. at 737 n.9.
378. Id.
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Notwithstanding this language, one may still conclude that
the violation of an individual's rights, including the rights of a
third party, should be a significant factor in evaluating, under
due process, the propriety of the government's conduct. By it-
self, this factor is not dispositive in federal courts, as the
Payner case suggests. But state courts can certainly consider
the violation of a third party's rights as a due process criterion
under their state constitutions.37 9 Moreover, one may argue
that Payner allows even federal courts to consider the violation
of a third party's rights if other factors, as in Isaacson, contrib-
ute to the due process violation. Combined with other exces-
sive actions, such conduct may then render investigative
methods so egregious as to violate principles of fairness.
An investigation using a staged arrest may violate individ-
ual rights and thus meet this criterion. Rights could be in-
fringed in the implementation of the staged arrest, as in any
other investigative operation. Violations of individual rights
did not occur in the Archer or Nigrone cases,380 however, and
such violations need not be, and should not be, a part of a
staged arrest plan.
6. Minimization of Harm
In evaluating whether the government violated due pro-
cess, one should consider its attempts to limit harmful conse-
quences to societal and to individual rights, because such
attempts shed light on the fairness of the procedure and the
motives of the government agency.3 81 This is not to say that
the failure to minimize potentially adverse social consequences
necessarily suggests improper conduct or bad faith. Rather, it
suggests that affirmative attempts to minimize harm might al-
lay criticism of the operation based on other due process fac-
tors. Although far from dispositive, minimization of harm can
be another useful tool for analytical purposes.
Congress has endorsed this principle by enacting a statute
requiring government officials to minimize the potential harm
379. See, e.g., note 51 supra and accompanying text.
380. See text accompanying notes 24-79 supra.
381. The United States Attorney General's office has issued guidelines rec-
ommending the principle of minimizing harm in undercover investigations. See
GUIMELINES ON CRIMNAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 272, at 3 ("Before employ-
ing a technique, the FBI should consider whether the information could be ob-
tained in a timely and effective way by less intrusive means."); id. at 10, 12
(need "to minimize the risks of harm and intrusion;" FBI shall take reasonable
steps to minimize certain types of undercover activity).
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to society or the rights of individuals in using one particularly
intrusive investigative technique-electronic eavesdropping. 382
Congress intended to give law enforcement all of the essential
tools to combat crime, but insisted that those tools be used
carefully so that the government would not unnecessarily in-
fringe upon the rights of individual privacy.383 Accordingly,
when electronically monitoring conversations, law enforcement
officials must refrain from intercepting and recording conversa-
tions not related to their investigation.384
In many other cases, the government is clearly able to min-
inize the harm its operation might cause by using voluntary
measures. For example, in one investigation in which the gov-
ernment infiltrated a drug manufacturing ring and assisted in
establishing and operating the laboratory, the government pre-
vented the public distribution of the manufactured drugs by
procuring them itself.385 Similarly, in United States v. Twigg,
the government located its drug laboratory in a farmhouse in
an isolated area because the defendant had announced that he
intended to stand guard at the site with a loaded shotgun.388
The government might conduct an investigation using a
staged arrest in a manner preventing it from satisfying this cri-
terion. Yet, there are many steps it could take to minimize the
harms of a staged arrest. In People v. Archer, for example, offi-
cials instructed the undercover agent not to record or transmit
the proceedings mechanically before the grand jury, and to
limit his testimony solely to the story concocted by defendant
Klein.38 7 Moreover, the government claimed, and the court
agreed, that it took affirmative steps to limit the deception of
judges to the minimum extent necessary. Finally, the govern-
ment communicated the plan to the Chief Judge of the highest
court in New York State, thereby demonstrating candor and
good faith. Another way in which the government could mini-
mize harm in some instances would be not to proceed to the
382. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) requires that an eavesdropping warrant must
"contain a provision that the authorization to intercept... shall be conducted
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise
subject to interception'
383. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). See also C. FsHMANm,
supra note 290, at 203.
384. There is considerable judicial confusion over the concept of minimiza-
tion in the area of wiretapping. See, e.g., C. FsmAN, supra note 290, at 203-04.
385. United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976).
386. 588 F.2d 373, 386 n.12 (Adams, J., dissenting).
387. 68 A.D.2d 441, 417 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (1979), affid, 49 N.Y.2d 978, 406
N.ER.2d 804, 428 N.Y.S.2d 949, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
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grand jury.3 88
VI. PREVENTATIVE DUE PROCESS: A WARRANT FOR
THE STAGED ARREST
Although the entrapment doctrine cannot adequately pre-
vent the abuses that might arise if the government uses staged
arrests, 89 courts could employ the due process criteria identi-
fied above to condemn overly intrusive undercover investiga-
tive practices. Yet even if these criteria were adopted,
government officials might be reluctant to manufacture staged
arrests because of their highly controversial nature.3 90 More-
over, the criteria would operate only after the fact, and would
not be able to prevent the possible harms from occurring.
Thus, the most effective restraint on investigative excesses
would not operate after the staged arrest operation was com-
plete, but would operate before it began. It would allow the
government to carry out only those investigations that are rea-
sonable and proper, and would prohibit all others.
Prosecutors have long been subject to one such restraint:
the constitutional requirement of a warrant in advance of
searches and seizures.3 91 This provision of the fourth amend-
ment was designed to prevent arbitrary and unjustified govern-
mental intrusions.392 It requires a "neutral and detached"
388. Investigators could structure the case so that attempts to induce cor-
rupt responses from court officials would occur prior to any grand jury presen-
tation. Also, in some jurisdictions, a felony case could be processed by a
"prosecutor's information" as opposed to a grand jury indictment. See N.Y.
CRmM. PRoc. LAw § 195.40 (McKinney 1974).
389. See text accompanying notes 83-169 supra.
390. Both the federal and state appellate courts in Archer and Nigrone
soundly criticized the technique. See text accompanying notes 36-37, 67 supra.
391. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
392. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 411 (1974). An "unjustified" search is a search that interferes with a per-
son's security when there is no good reason to do so. An "arbitrary" search is
an unregulated and general rummaging beyond the scope of the official's
power.
General warrants and writs of assistance that allowed arbitrary and indis-
criminate searches and seizures were the "immediate evils that motivated the
framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 583 (1980). As the Supreme Court explained in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476 (1965):
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those
general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of
the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists. The hated writs of assist-
ance had given customs officials blanket authority to search where they
pleased for goods imported in violation of British tax laws. They were
denounced by James Otis as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles
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magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to
suspect that a crime is being or has been committed, rather
than leaving that determination to a police officer "engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 93
Also, the search warrant must describe the place that the of-
ficers will search and the persons or things they will seize, so
that the police do not have unlimited discretion in their
investigation.394
Thus, a properly detailed staged arrest warrant could pre-
vent abuses in an investigation using a staged arrest just as the
search warrant prevents abuses in police searches and
seizures.395 Although one could not advocate their use on
fourth amendment grounds, since staged arrests do not involve
searches or seizures, 396 there are other ways to establish staged
arrest warrants. Legislatures could pass statutes mandating
their use based on the legislatures' general police powers, or
courts could mandate their use based either on common law or
on constitutional grounds such as due process. 397
If government officials routinely applied for staged arrest
warrants that set out their factual predicate, their investigative
alternatives, the details of the manufactured crime and its pre-
dicted progression through the judicial system, their solicita-
tion methods, and their predicted involvement in the crime
under investigation, the warrants would mitigate the abuses to
of law, that ever was found in an English law book," because they
placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
Id. at 481-82.
393. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
394. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
395. Others have suggested the use of investigative warrants in other con-
texts. For example, an official British report proposed that the police must ob-
tain a warrant from a magistrate before soliciting a person to commit an
offense. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE
(Cmd. No. 3997) 42 (1929). For other proposals, see Comment, Present and Sug-
gested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforce-
ment, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 261, 283 (1969); Comment, The Applicability of the
"New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed De-
lineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 785 (1970); Donnelly, supra note 100. A task force report on organized
crime also recommends that some form of judicial authorization circumscribe
simulated offenses and false oaths. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN-
IZED CRImE 52-53 (1976).
396. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
397. It is questionable whether law enforcement agencies, as a practical
matter, would seriously consider utilizing a warrant procedure in investigations
unless legally required to do so. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police
Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REv. 203, 215 n.16 (1975).
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which staged arrests are prone. As noted above, staged arrests
may not meet five of the due process criteria, depending on the
circumstances: the government's factual justification,98 its
good faith,399 the nature of its solicitation,400 the violation of in-
dividual rights,401 and the government's effort to minimize
harmful consequences. 40 2
By requiring a factual predicate, a description of the inves-
tigator's suspicions, and the facts underlying those suspicions,
a warrant would not only ensure that the government's actions
are not unjustified or arbitrary,403 but would also guarantee
that the government acted on the basis of specific substantive
law enforcement goals, and would thus negate an accusation
that the government acted in bad faith.404 To establish a suffi-
cient factual justification, the prosecutor may, for example, re-
veal general information about widespread fixing of cases in a
particular court, as in the Archer case,40 5 or specific information
that a particular government official has acted corruptly, as in
the Nigrone case.406 A longstanding pattern of questionable de-
cisions involving the same judges and lawyers might also suf-
fice. By contrast, if an affidavit recites only a generalized
suspicion that government officials may be responsive to cor-
rupt overtures, or otherwise discloses that the prosecutor
wishes only to test the integrity of individuals at random, the
court should swiftly veto the investigation.
A description of the government's solicitation plans that in-
cludes the individuals whom it would approach and the induce-
ments it would offer would give the magistrate an indication of
whether the solicitation is excessive. For example, a plan to
approach a judge with a bribe offer of $20,000 to dismiss a minor
offense should be closely scrutinized. Similarly, a plan to im-
portune repeatedly a defense attorney to suborn perjury also
should be carefully examined. If not limited by some form of
judicial oversight, such solicitations might lead persons not
truly criminally disposed to commit crimes that they would
398. See text accompanying notes 270-72 supra.
399. See text accompanying notes 285-87 supra.
400. See text accompanying note 354 supra.
401. See text accompanying note 380 supra.
402. See text accompanying notes 387-88 supra.
403. See text accompanying notes 264-69 supra.
404. See text accompanying notes 273-84 supra. In addition, by requiring an
early statement of the crime the government wishes to investigate, the warrant
diminishes the subjective element of this criterion. See id.
405. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
406. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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otherwise not commit.40 7
If the government sets out the specific nature of its pro-
posed operation, giving detailed information as to where and
when it will occur and whom it will involve, the magistrate
could also determine whether the operation intrudes upon any
individual's rights. For example, information indicating the
government has used, or will have to use, undue force to per-
suade an informant to participate in the staged arrest calls for
judicial suspicion.
Finally, by including the full details of the staged arrest
plan, and by ensuring that the government's proposals are rea-
sonable and proper, the warrant would require the government
to minimize the social and individual harms that a staged ar-
rest could produce. For instance, the government officials
should provide the court with a careful and detailed description
of the staged arrest plan and its implementation. They should
apprise the magistrate of the crime they intend to simulate, the
actors involved, and the likelihood of harm to persons or prop-
erty. They should also disclose whether the plan contemplates
false representations to judges or grand jurors or the use of
false official documents. The court would then be able to deter-
mine whether the government has acted in good faith in an at-
tempt to minimize harmful consequences from the operation to
the least amount necessary for the investigation's effectiveness.
The warrant would not only work to prevent these five pos-
sible abuses, it would also work to guarantee that the staged ar-
rest would meet the three criteria described earlier the
necessity for the staged arrest,408 the government's participa-
tion in criminal activity,40 9 and the generation of social
harms. 410
An analysis of the lack of available investigative alterna-
tives would reassure the magistrate that the investigator must
use the staged arrest technique to ferret out judicial corruption.
The affidavit should explain that the only practicable way to de-
tect the individuals suspected of corrupt acts is to fabricate a
criminal case as bait for the suspected "fix." It should articu-
late the reasons why alternative investigative techniques would
compromise the secrecy of the investigation, or would require
recruitment of public or private individuals with divided loyal-
407. See text accompanying notes 331-51 supra.
408. See text accompanying notes 297-300 supra.
409. See text accompanying notes 323-30 supra.
410. See text accompanying notes 363-64 supra.
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ties. Because such an undercover investigation is necessary,41'
given a factual justification for the operation, the magistrate
should not be too hesitant in finding that the investigators have
satisfied this requirement.
As pointed out above, if the government sets forth, as re-
quired, the crimes and the harm to society it may have to com-
mit, the warrant encourages their minimization because the
magistrate will veto any excessively harmful plan. This war-
rant proposal thus guarantees, as far as possible, that the five
most easily implicated due process criteria are met. It also pro-
vides even further assurances that the three criteria that
staged arrest investigations probably meet are not violated.
An investigative warrant is a controversial approach, and
one not likely to be embraced by law enforcement officials un-
less legally required. Nevertheless, if proposed investigative
conduct involves extreme undercover methods of crime detec-
tion or intrudes into sensitive areas of government, law en-
forcement might wisely opt for some form of warrant
procedure. Indeed, it is quite possible that in contrast to its
condemnation in Nigrone, the Archer court sustained the gov-
ernment's questionable tactics because the prosecutor submit-
ted his official plan to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
in advance.412 This limited disclosure implied both good faith
and recognition that the investigative technique demands justi-
fication. Thus, judicial authorization should be employed to le-
gitimize the prospective use of a staged arrest.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the principal judicial limits on
the undercover investigative technique known as the staged ar-
rest. The courts have vigorously condemned this technique as
a flagrant example of law enforcement misconduct, and have
only cautiously approved it as a necessary device to expose cor-
ruption in the judicial system. Unquestionably, the frequent,
unjustified, or arbitrary use of this procedure demands judicial
control. But because the entrapment doctrine is generally inef-
fective, the only available judicial control is due process. And
given the courts' inadequate definition of due process, an ac-
ceptable analysis requires the use of a more detailed set of cri-
teria-as set forth above. These criteria, which provide
effective postinvestigation control, in conjunction with the war-
411. See notes 297-300 supra and accompanying text.
412. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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rant requirement, which provides effective preinvestigation
control, eliminate the unattractive features of the staged arrest
procedure, and create a viable method to detect and deter judi-
cial corruption.
